Read the original article in Vietnamese here
 
Foreign Affairs recently featured an article by Ely Ratner, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Biden administration, proposing the formation of a collective defense bloc in Asia among the United States, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines (PLP). Ratner argues that such an initiative is not only desirable but entirely feasible, for several reasons:
 
Firstly, the United States has promoted a networked alliance system in recent years, in which the three countries have been strengthening their ties both with Washington and with one another. 
 
Secondly, while Trump may not prioritize alliances, the defense and security policies of the U.S. and its partners have remained largely consistent. Even in the absence of Trump’s strategic vision, relevant government agencies across the four countries continue to follow this trajectory, laying the groundwork for a future alliance bloc. 
Thirdly, the U.S. had previously considered such an approach in the post-World War II period. Its alliance network has repeatedly demonstrated a “self-repairing” capacity 2in the wake of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, during waves of decolonization and democratization, and throughout the Cold War. 
 
Finally, it is the leadership of these countries that has moved toward supporting a more cohesive alliance bloc: Japan has moved toward a more proactive defense strategy and expressed support for an “Asian NATO”; the Philippines has shifted its focus from domestic to external affairs; and Australia is reassessing its national security strategy.
 
In addition, the author proposes a roadmap to advance the formation of this prospective alliance bloc.
 
Firstly, regarding membership, the bloc would initially comprise four core countries, with the potential for others to join at a later stage. South Korea and New Zealand are identified as the most likely candidates. India and Singapore are unlikely to become founding members but may participate as observers in selected activities. European involvement remains limited at present due to insufficient military capabilities, though future engagement could be considered.
 
Secondly, in terms of functions, the alliance should concentrate on defense and security, leaving diplomatic and economic matters to other institutions. Accordingly:
  • Collective defense could be built upon existing cooperation projects, including intelligence-sharing, maritime domain awareness, joint training and exercises, and integrated command and control mechanisms. For instance, the newly established U.S.-Japan Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell at Yokota Air Base focuses on monitoring Chinese activities in the East China Sea. At the same time, the new U.S.-Philippine Combined Coordination Center near Manila aims to enhance surveillance of China in the South China Sea and beyond.
  • The bloc could evolve from the network of Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAAs) already signed among the three countries, laying the foundation for shared military facilities - Japan and Hawaii are identified as the most viable locations.
  • A series of working groups should be established to negotiate the full range of policy and legal issues related to operational integration.
  • The three countries must also rebalance their strategic relationships with the United States. The U.S. can no longer afford to guarantee allied security without reciprocal commitments. Deepening cooperation would not only reinforce burden-sharing but also serve to counter Chinese disinformation and reassure an increasingly nationalistic American public. For instance, the alliance treaty should include provisions requiring U.S. allies to support the U.S. in global crises or in the defense of the U.S. homeland itself.
Thirdly, in preparation for managing public opinion, the author argues that domestic constituencies across all three countries will need to be persuaded.
  • Beyond standard deterrence and security narratives, the U.S. could help generate domestic support in allied countries by emphasizing the benefits of technology transfers, infrastructure investment, and enhanced disaster response capabilities.
  • The U.S. must also reassure its own public that the new alliance will not entail additional obligations. To regional audiences, the U.S. should clearly communicate that this new bloc does not signal the abandonment of existing commitments to groupings such as the Quad, ASEAN, or U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral mechanisms.
  • The U.S. should publicly link the new alliance to the U.S.’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy and brand it under the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” label, increasing its legitimacy and acceptance in the region.
  • The U.S. should assist the three allied countries in responding to expected Chinese retaliation, particularly in the form of economic coercion and disinformation operations.
The author’s proposal is notably bold, similar to the idea of transforming the current “Squad” into a modern-day NATO for the Indo-Pacific. If realized, such a move could heighten tensions and reinforce Cold War-like dynamics in the region - an outcome that most regional states seek to avoid, especially those pursuing a hedging strategy between major powers.
 
Moreover, the article does not sufficiently account for the implications of the United States’ increasingly transactional approach to alliances under Trump 2.0. U.S. allies have already begun lowering their expectations of Washington’s reliability, which may undermine the political will that is necessary to establish a formal defense bloc. It would be inherently difficult for the U.S. to simultaneously convince its domestic audience that it bears no new obligations while also providing comprehensive support to allies in countering retaliatory moves from China.