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On April 9, Asia Times published an op-ed by Singaporean scholar Marcus Loh, arguing that U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s visit to the region has yet to assuage Southeast Asia’s three main concerns regarding Washington’s evolving approach under the Trump 2.0 administration.

1/ The “sphere of influence” risks

Recent actions by the Trump 2.0 administration in Canada, Panama, Greenland, and Yemen, etc. suggest a growing prioritization of economic interests over strategic imperatives.
Security concerns raised by Trump 2.0 appear primarily instrumental - used as bargaining chips in economic negotiations. Leaked documents from Signal also point to a willingness within the administration to subordinate strategic concerns, such as freedom of navigation in the Middle East, to economic calculations.

2/ Over-Militarized Engagement

Trump 2.0's regional approach is overly militarized, exemplified by the establishment of a new Theater Command in Japan and expanded deployments in the Philippines. This strategy risks diminishing deterrence effectiveness for two reasons: (i) It increasingly casts the region as a Cold War-style arc of containment targeting China - an image Southeast Asia seeks to avoid; (ii) The U.S.’s pursuit of an “anti-access doctrine” focused on three hotspots - Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands - risks entrenching long-term alignments that key ASEAN members such as Indonesia and Malaysia are reluctant to embrace.

Additionally, Trump 2.0's robust support for Taiwan - through arms deals and assertive diplomatic statements - narrows Beijing’s strategic options and raises the specter of military escalation, unsettling many in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, efforts to normalize Japan’s military posture could rekindle painful historical memories of Japanese militarism across the region.

3/ Lack of Comprehensive Diplomacy
 
A key shortcoming in Trump 2.0’s regional policy lies in the absence of comprehensive diplomacy - a necessary pillar for credible deterrence.

The administration’s diplomatic posture has lacked nuance, intensifying pressures for alignment and alienating key middle powers. Trump's approaches in Ukraine and the Middle East have failed to deliver the successes he claims, casting his deterrence credentials as more performative than substantive. Moreover, no credible economic initiative has been proposed for ASEAN. Instead, the administration has levied broad economic measures affecting the entire region, including strategic partners like Singapore that maintain balanced trade with the U.S. under a Free Trade Agreement.

In contrast, China appears to be shifting away from its earlier “wolf warrior diplomacy,” instead doubling down on regional charm offensives, underscored by President Xi Jinping’s forthcoming tour of multiple Southeast Asian countries.

Overall, the author (Marcus Loh) presents arguments that largely align with the prevailing perspectives of Southeast Asian states. The region welcomes a U.S. presence that contributes to strategic equilibrium, reinforces the rule of law and multilateralism, and fosters shared prosperity without propelling the region toward confrontation or conflict.

Nevertheless, the analysis may exhibit certain limitations. First, the author omits several longstanding criticisms, particularly voiced by South China Sea littoral states, including: (i) Washington’s waning strategic attention to the region due to its preoccupation with other hotspots or limited bandwidth. For example, despite repeated high-level references to the South China Sea, the Trump 2.0 administration has yet to issue a dedicated statement on the issue in nearly three months; (ii) A perceived U.S. tendency to prioritize Northeast Asia over Southeast Asia, treating its commitments to ASEAN as rhetorical rather than substantive; (iii) A continued framing of regional engagement primarily through the lens of great power competition rather than recognizing Southeast Asia’s intrinsic value and agency.

Second, the article may overstate the coherence of ASEAN’s position on U.S. engagement. For instance, the Philippines has emerged as the most receptive to U.S. military initiatives and vocal in its support for Taiwan - positions that contrast with the more cautious stances of other ASEAN members.

Third, the Trump 2.0 team has yet to fully consolidate its Asia policy apparatus, suggesting that significant adjustments may still be forthcoming.

Translated by HCHD