ASEAN's Strategic Choice in Response to U.S. Tariff Policy: What Potential for the Special Meeting of ASEAN Economic Ministers? (10 April)

On 5 April 2025, ASEAN leaders, including Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, and His Majesty Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei Darussalam, held a phone conference to deliberate on President Donald Trump’s recently announced retaliatory tariff policy (2 April) and possible collective responses.

 

Via his official account on platform X, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim stated: (i) As ASEAN Chair, Malaysia is committed to fostering consensus among member states and upholding the principles of fairness and equality in all trade negotiations, including in the context of ASEAN–U.S. dialogue; (ii) The upcoming ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting (scheduled for tomorrow, 10 April) will address the issue and seek the best possible solutions for all member states.

 

At this juncture, the central question is not whether ASEAN can produce a unified joint statement in response to the U.S. retaliatory tariffs, but rather: What kind of statement is most likely to be endorsed by the bloc?

 

At present, a majority of member states, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have explicitly emphasized ASEAN’s role in confronting and adapting to the Trump administration’s policy. Notably, on 6 April, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim confirmed he had reached out to Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto to discuss and coordinate a collective regional response to the tariff measures.

 

These pre-summit references to ASEAN's institutional role, as well as consultations among key leaders, reflect a shared political will to develop a collective approach to the Trump administration’s protectionist shift.

 

Accordingly, the most intensively debated issues at the upcoming ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting are likely to concern: (i) the language and tone of any collective statement, and (ii) the formulation of concrete economic and trade countermeasures that member states could adopt in a coordinated fashion.

 

Regarding the first issue, a synthesis and comparison of ASEAN member states’ responses as of 5 April suggest a broadly restrained, conciliatory posture, one oriented toward stability and engagement with the United States. While Cambodia’s statement has been somewhat more assertive, directly challenging U.S. trade figures, invoking WTO rules, and pledging to counter Washington’s claims with specific evidence, the country is nonetheless likely to support a joint ASEAN statement grounded in goodwill and cooperation. Phnom Penh is actively pursuing economic and diplomatic diversification, and given its limited economic and trade leverage vis-à-vis the United States, a conciliatory stance may well constitute the more strategic course of action.

 

In terms of economic and trade countermeasures, one of the key instruments that ASEAN could activate in response to the Trump administration’s tariff policy is the ASEAN-U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Established in 2006, this framework serves as a long-standing platform for economic dialogue, allowing both sides to address trade barriers and coordinate policy responses. ASEAN could legitimately propose a special session under the TIFA mechanism to deliberate on the newly imposed tariffs while simultaneously negotiating exemptions for strategic sectors or product categories, such as electronics, high-tech components, and textiles, areas in which U.S. businesses themselves remain significantly reliant on regional supply chains.

 

However, ASEAN should not adopt a purely defensive posture; rather, it must capitalize on existing mechanisms to advance its strategic interests. In this regard, regional trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) can serve as strategic “exit routes”, helping ASEAN states reduce their overreliance on the U.S. market.

 

For instance, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore - already members of the CPTPP - can more fully leverage tariff concessions and market access commitments from intra-bloc partners. In parallel, ASEAN should also seek to engage the private sector through platforms such as the ASEAN-U.S. Business Summit, encouraging major corporations, such as Apple and Intel, to speak out on the adverse impacts of tariffs on their supply chains.

 

Moreover, bilateral trade issues and U.S. tariff policy should be placed on the agenda of the ASEAN-U.S. Summit, thereby elevating these matters to the highest diplomatic level for sustained dialogue and negotiation.

 

The current challenge is not merely a matter of tariffs but a litmus test for ASEAN’s cohesion and negotiating resolve amid an increasingly fragmented global economic order.

Rather than issuing disjointed responses, ASEAN now has the opportunity to assert itself as a cohesive political-economic entity - one capable of leveraging collective strength to negotiate in a manner that is principled, strategic, and non-confrontational.

 

In the post-globalization era, ASEAN’s ability to adapt with both flexibility and foresight will be a decisive factor - not only for the region’s resilience but also for its capacity to shape the emerging rules of the game.