US Military Aids Under President Drawdown Authority for Taiwan: Potential Hurdle and Regional Implications

 

 

The PDA is a special authority that allows the US President to direct the drawdown of defense articles and services from the stock of the Department of Defense to a foreign country in case of an “unforeseen emergency”. According to the Department of State, this mechanism allows assistance to “begin arriving within days—or even hours—of approval”. Since February 2022, the US has transferred 72 aid packages to Ukraine under PDA, consisting vital military equipment and weapons that worth total USD 6bln. 

 

By eliminating lengthy administrative, approval, procurement, contracting and manufacturing processes, the PDA stands out as a measure to enhance US deterrence capabilities. It strengthens two common elements of deterrence efficiency: credibility and capability. First, simplified decision-making processes and quick delivery of military equipment facilitate deterrence capability by allowing the US to promptly and decisively respond to scenarios of heightened tensions or open conflicts, such as one between mainland China and Taiwan.

 

Secondly, while PDA has been employed to transfer US military aids to 80 recipients between 1961 and 2021, only Ukraine and Taiwan received amounts exceeding the $100m ceiling stipulated by the FAA, making these recipients “unique.” For Taiwan, such exclusivity can signal strengthened US political commitment of the US, thus reinforcing the credibility US deterrence.

 

 

While PDA facilitates speedy responses and delivery of military goods in case of a Taiwan crisis, pace does not mean everything and US military aids under PDA for Taiwan could still face potential technical difficulties.

 

When a crisis breaks out, China might impose a blockade over Taiwan before conducting offensive actions, impeding the PDA’s effectiveness. Theoretically, China sees joint-blockade as a mean to cut its enemy’s connection with the outside world, and to weaken the enemy’s military and economic capabilities as well as public and political resolve. Blocking Taiwan to gain initial leverage is therefore consistent with China’s “restraint warfare” strategy, which implies avoiding war first through coordination between military preparedness, conventional-strategic forces, political and diplomatic efforts to “subdue enemy’s forces without fighting”. Some military analysts also suggest that blockade might lie within the first phase of China’s invasion plan against Taiwan.

 

Empirically, Taiwan vulnerabilities stemming from its geographical location and reliance on maritime trade suggest that blocking the island might be a  “strategically viable option” for China. Observers further note that in the Russo-Ukrainian war, European countries are still able to supply Ukraine against Russia with weapons via land, some of which have been acknowledged by China’s military analysts. This lesson might also encourage China to impose a blockade over Taiwan if a conflict breaks out.  In recent years, China has been mobilizing forces around Taiwan to simulate air-and-maritime blockade scenarios, potentially for a blockade preparation.

 

Some tactical and political factors might hinder US’s attempts to deliver PDA against the blockade. Regarding tactical factors, first, China’s recent blockade exercises usually came without any prior notice and have been seen as a “normalization” of the activities. In addition, there is a difference in the length of recent China’s blockade simulations, with five, two and one days for drills in August 2022, May and October 2024 respectively. Such trends and inconsistencies could either make it harder for the US to foresee when a blockade will happen, or to decipher which signals imply a real blockade. Moreover, observers have pointed to the discrepancies in Taipei and Washington’s conclusions over China’s recent unannounced military deployment near Taiwan from 9 to 12 December. While Taiwan viewed the event as a “severe threat”, US officials just described it as a “consistent” continuation of China's escalating activities in the region. These diverging assessments further highlight the strategic uncertainties and confusions generated by China’s normalization of blockade, which in turn hinder the quick and efficient decision-making regime that US aims to build and foster through the PDA.

 

Second, for the US, breaking the blockade might be very costly, even when it has an abundance of military forces based within the region. At sea, an effective maritime blockade conducted by China might include seizure or destruction of Taiwan’s ports and gain control of the island’s coastlines where US military cargo ships could anchor, but due to Taiwan's complex terrain, there are only a few suitable unloading locations for delivering military supplies to the inland areas en masse. Furthermore, China might find it easier to disrupt US sealift attempts due to its closer geographical proximity to Taiwan. Experts have also warned about the shortages of US merchant ship necessary to provide emergency goods to Taiwan in case of contingency, as well as technical difficulties in unloading equipment at shore due to the complexity of floating pier system and weather conditions.

 

Breaking the blockade via air delivery would also be a dangerous attempt, as US aircrafts would have to fly under China’s advanced A2/AD systems. China might also preemptively destroy Taiwan’s runways vital for cargo planes’ operations, as option for an preemptive strike has in fact been conceptualized in China’s theory of victory as System Destruction Warfare, which “seeks to paralyze and even destroy the critical functions of an enemy’s operational system”. Furthermore, experts have noted that air transport can only handle lightweight items, rendering the measure insufficient to arm Taiwan with advanced weapons like tanks and missiles much needed for a sustained defensive against China, as they are too heavy or technically sophisticated to be airlifting or paradropped.

 

Third, the US could hardly rely on its regional allies to break the blockade. Neither South Korea, Japan, nor the Philippines has formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, let alone a mutual support pact, leaving them no legal obligations to directly protect Taiwan. Japan is even restrained by its constitution which states that collective defense only be exercised when there is a threat to Japan’s national existence. Even when South Korea and Japan have strategic incentives to keep Taiwan safe, breaking through a blockade and thereby being directly involved in a war with China is not widely desired. Recent polls show that as many as 42% of South Koreans  only support their country’s role as a rear-area supporter for US forces during a Taiwan contingency, out of 64.5% who advocate for some degree of South Korea’s involvement in US military operations. In Japan’s 2024 national poll, only 12.6% of respondents support Japan to fight along US forces if China attacks Taiwan, 29.6% favor Japan providing just logistic support for the US, and 28.5% oppose any Japan’s military involvement.

 

Regarding political factor, if China formally declares a blockade, then US efforts to break it to deliver arms to Taiwan could be deemed aggression against China, thus inviting retaliation from the latter, especially when China has claimed that it has sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Straits, and that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. Historically, during the First World War, the United Kingdom seized US cargo ships trying to break the blockade that the former had imposed on Germany, labeling US ships’ activities as aggression and rendering itself the right to seize the US ships.

 

China’s political resolve to take such an act in a blockade scenario should not be overlooked. For China, the reunification of Taiwan is not only a political objective but also an essential component of modern Chinese nationalism that fosters legitimacy for the country’s leadership. Furthermore, China’s highly centralized political system enables comprehensive policy-and-decision implementation but gives little room for flexibility and adjustment. Therefore, if China declares a blockade – and thus war – on Taiwan, the country is likely to be deeply committed to the cause. China might view any inactions that consequently lead to failure of its blockade campaign as not just a mere strategic defeat but also a humiliation that endangers China’s Communist Party’s rule.

 

Meanwhile, US political determination with regard to this matter is less clear. First, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act does not obligate the US to intervene if China blocks or attacks Taiwan but only to provide the island with means to defend itself. Second, the PDA only eliminates administrative procedures, whereas the means by which military aid packages are transferred to the recipient remains unspecified. Therefore, in a Taiwan blockade scenario, the delivery of such aid would likely spark an intensive debate among US political forces on whether should the US risk being shot and involved in a war with China to break the blockade. Despite a bipartisan support for Taiwan, the US has not demonstrated any intentions to directly involve to protect Taiwan, at least partly due to the exercise of “strategic ambiguity”. However, there is dwindling US public support for their country’s activeness in global affair as well as reluctance to deploy US military involvement if China attacks Taiwan, as recent polls showed.

 

 

Despite the theoretical deterrence effects of PDA against Chinese aggression, on-site developments suggest that these aids might further invite China’s provocative acts. Shortly after the announcement of the US $567m PDA military aid package to Taiwan, on 14 October 2024, the China conducted ‘Joint Sword 2024B’ exercises simulating the blockade of Taiwan. While the drills were linked to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s National Day Speech on 10 October, the underlying connection between such drills and US PDA aids to Taiwan should not be overlooked. 

 

Global Taiwan Institute’s compilation of China’s exercises around Taiwan from 2018-2024 shows that many exercises were conducted against events that indicate intensifying US-Taiwan relations (e.g. increased US support for Taiwan, official visits). It is worth noting that some seemingly irrelevant cases might also follow the abovementioned trend. For instances, ‘Joint Sword 2024A’ exercises were carried out in May 2024, a month after the US approved a USD 8bln defense package to Taiwan. China’s air-and-sea space control drills in August 2023 around Taiwan came shortly after a US military aid package of USD 345m in July (also under PDA). And while China has yet to provide details about its latest deployments from 9 to 12 December, it is notable that earlier on 1 December, the US had approved new arm sales worth USD 385m to Taiwan.

 

Therefore, there could be a retaliatory link between China’s blockade-simulating drills against Taiwan and US military support for the island. Within such a context, the PDA aids might further provoke further escalatory acts from China. They have failed to prevent China from conducting exercises and aggression against Taiwan (Joint Sword 2024b as an example). Worse, because of abovementioned political and symbolical merits of PDA aids when compared to other means of support, China might be encouraged to take further aggressive acts, citing such aids as a justification. China could also interpret PDA aids in ways that strengthen its own narratives which frame the US as an aggressor and a destabilizing force in the region.

 

Additionally, the PDA’s shortcomings as a deterrence measure might lead to miscalculations. While PDA aids do convey credibility due to their unique allocation to Taiwan, the lack of a corresponding capability renders this deterrence measure essentially vague in terms of outcomes/consequences. Ironically, communication regarding such consequences is also crucial for deterrence. Given the vague threats and consequences, as well as limited crisis management and military-to-military communication lines between the US and China, misinterpretations and miscalculations are more likely. China might further use military exercises or aggressions against US military support to Taiwan to test the resilience of US-Taiwan relations and the duo’s self-restraints, or even to purposely cause miscalculations. Misunderstanding of such intentions might ignite an open conflict, further destabilizing the security landscape in Asia-Pacific. 

More robust PDA aids to Taiwan will likely face increased threats and aggression from China. Misinterpretation of these responses by the US, leading to further increased aid, could justify China's attack on Taiwan. Unclear China’s true intentions when conducting these blockades - whether a show of force or a declaration of war - also make it more difficult for the US to decide when to accelerate its military aids to Taiwan. Slow reactions and low decisiveness will render existing non-emergency PDA aid ineffective and shut the door on any future emergency attempts, while the opposite risks sparking a deadly regional war.

 

In conclusion, PDA seems to be an effective mechanism through which the US could arm Taiwan and increase deterrence against potential China’ attack without having to endure lengthy internal processes, similar to the case of its usage in Ukraine. However, if a Sino-Taiwan conflict breaks out, China will likely impose an effective blockade over Taiwan, rendering the PDA ineffective. Changes in the size, nature, timeline, and components of PDA aids also have the potentials to escalate regional tension and miscalculation probability.

 

Khanh Nam* - Revised/Edited by Hoang Do

*The points reflect personal opinions, not their affiliation.