U.S.-Cambodia Relations under Trump 2.0: Are the Barriers Gradually Being Removed?

 

During President Donald Trump’s second term, U.S.–Cambodia relations have experienced a series of notable and unprecedented improvements.

 

October 2025: Washington and Phnom Penh concluded a reciprocal trade agreement that included Cambodia’s commitment to permit U.S. investment in the extraction of critical minerals.

 

October 31, 2025: ASEAN Security Summit (Malaysia): The two defense ministers agreed to resume the Angkor Sentinel exercises, suspended since 2017. This marks the first restoration of practical, field-level military cooperation in nearly eight years.

 

November 2025: The U.S. lifted the arms embargo imposed in 2021, citing Cambodia’s renewed pursuit of peace, its resumption of defense cooperation with Washington, and its collaboration on transnational crime. On December 5, the U.S. Mission to ASEAN confirmed that Cambodia had agreed to expand cooperation in both defense and transnational crime.

 

January 24–28, 2026: The USS Cincinnati docked at Ream Naval Base—the first foreign naval vessel to visit Cambodia in 2026, and only the third (after Japan’s JS Bungo and JS Etajima in April 2025) to call at Ream since the base’s Chinese-funded upgrade.

 

February 3, 2026: The U.S. Department of Commerce formally removed Cambodia from its arms‑export “blacklist.”

 

 

Observers point to several drivers behind the recent tendency in U.S.-Cambodia relations:

 

- A more “pragmatic” Trump administration, prioritizing economic interests and strategic competition with China over strong pressure on democracy and human rights.

 

- U.S. strategic calculations, particularly the desire to regain influence in Cambodia—an increasingly important node in the Mekong subregion and a focal point in U.S.–China competition, especially regarding sensitive security issues such as Ream Naval Base.

 

- Cambodia’s own diversification strategy, aimed at reducing risks associated with heavy dependence on China while strengthening its defense capacity amid regional uncertainties (post‑COVID economic pressures, border frictions with Thailand, and more).

 

- Prime Minister Hun Manet’s flexible and outward‑looking leadership, which has helped remove longstanding obstacles and gradually rebuild strategic trust with Washington.

 

 

The incremental restoration of defense ties indicates a slow but meaningful improvement in political–military trust after years of tension. Current cooperation remains limited to less sensitive areas—peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and capacity‑building—but these steps lay the groundwork for broader engagement in the future.

 

Some scholars argue that a stable Cambodia–U.S. relationship would not only benefit both sides but also contribute to ASEAN’s peace and stability. For Cambodia, diversified partnerships help expand strategic space and reduce over‑reliance on any single major power.

 

 

Other analysts caution that the warming trend is largely pragmatic and conditional, not a sign of a long‑term strategic reorientation. In their view:

 

- U.S. engagement remains driven primarily by geopolitical competition with China, rather than a deep commitment to Cambodia as a core strategic partner.

 

- Defense cooperation is still limited, and arms transfers continue to be reviewed case by case, reflecting Washington’s lingering concerns.

 

- Shifts in U.S. policy across administrations highlight inconsistency in long‑term commitment.

 

- Improved ties with Washington will not fundamentally alter Cambodia’s longstanding relationship with China; instead, they represent a calibrated adjustment to maximize national interests in a changing regional environment.