See the original article and video in Vietnamese here
 
1. China’s military exercises in the South China Sea have increased over the past two years
 
In 2025, China conducted at least 142 military exercises in the South China Sea, reflecting a steady upward trend since 2022. Specifically, China carried out 96 exercises in 2022, which declined slightly to 86 in 2023, before rising to 119 in 2024. Among these areas, the Huangyan/Scarborough Shoal has emerged not only as a major flashpoint in China-Philippines confrontations but also as an area where Beijing has conducted military activities with relatively high frequency. These activities included 9 patrol operations, comprising 4 by the China Coast Guard (CCG) and 5 by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
 
2. U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea have declined markedly since Trump 1.0
 
In 2025, the United States conducted two FONOPs in the South China Sea: one on 12 May near the Spratly Islands, and another on 13 August at the Scarborough Shoal, marking the first U.S. FONOP in this area since 2019. However, viewed from a broader perspective, the number of U.S. FONOPs has declined significantly in both frequency and geographic coverage. By comparison, during the Trump 1.0, the U.S. administration conducted as many as 28 FONOPs with wide geographic dispersion, including 13 operations in the Paracel Islands, 12 in the Spratly Islands, 2 at the Scarborough Shoal, and 1 around the Con Dao area.
 
Overall, the South China Sea security landscape in 2025 reflects a growing strategic asymmetry between the two major powers. While China has continued to increase the frequency and density of its military exercises - especially in contested areas such as the Huangyan/Scarborough Shoal - the United States has significantly scaled back its use of FONOPs, which have traditionally been regarded as a key instrument for asserting legal positions on the ground.
 
Based on the broader trajectory of both countries’ South China Sea policies in 2025, it can be seen that China’s expanding military exercise activities not only demonstrate efforts to enhance its readiness for military operations but also signal a more assertive and uncompromising stance. In contrast, the decline in the U.S. FONOPs aligns with the existing forecasts, assessments and policy implementation practices under Trump 2.0, suggesting that while the South China Sea remains strategically important to Washington, the United States has adjusted its foreign and domestic priorities. As a result, the reduction and recalibration of the U.S. engagement in the South China Sea appears increasingly inevitable.
 
In 2026, ASEAN countries will need to continue closely monitoring the evolving patterns of engagement by these two major powers in the South China Sea in order to accurately assess changes in the “balance of behavior” among major actors. This, in turn, will allow ASEAN to adjust its collective approach and prevent dense gray-zone and military activities from becoming a new normal. Enhancing information sharing, strengthening maritime domain awareness, and maintaining a unified voice grounded in international law - particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) - will be critical for ASEAN to preserve strategic space, mitigate escalation risks, and safeguard the region’s long-term interests in 2026 and beyond.
 

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- Content and visuals are produced by South China Sea Studies. Please cite the source if reposted.

- Data is compiled from open-source materials and therefore should be regarded as approximate; actual number may be higher.”