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1.Three-Factor Framework for U.S. “South China Sea Policy” Predictions
National interests - The consistent factor
U.S. core interests in the SCS are generally consistent. Successive U.S. administrations have maintained a relatively stable stance on the SCS, pursuing three main objectives. First, the SCS is linked to freedom of navigation, which serves as the foundation for free trade. Second, the SCS is part of the U.S. grand strategy, which involves upholding the so-called “rules-based order” and competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region. Third, the SCS is central to U.S. commitments to allies and partners, including the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Australia.[1] While different U.S. administrations may alter their interest priorities, the SCS has never lost its relevance. For example, the U.S. under Trump 1.0 emphasized direct competition with China, while Biden administration focused on strengthening alliances and expanding competition into various fields, such as technology, energy, and supply chains.[2]
Given the comprehensive U.S.-China competition, Trump 2.0 will likely preserve these core interests, thus ensuring continued U.S. attention towards the SCS. In fact, Trump 2.0 may integrate the SCS more closely with great-power competition and economic-military interests, including arms sales, linking military exchanges with economic benefits and shared security responsibilities, limiting the threats of conflicts in Taiwan and the SCS, or competing with China in emerging sectors such as technology, strategic supply chains, and renewable energy.
Policy traditions under Trump 1.0 and Biden - The identifiable factors
First, U.S. policy under Trump 1.0 era can serve as a basis for assessing potential patterns and trends of Trump 2.0 engagement in the SCS. During Trump 1.0, the U.S. undertook notable actions in four key areas, which Trump 2.0 may inherit and continue.
Militarily, the U.S. strengthened its presence in the SCS based on the “predictable strategy, unpredictable operations” model by significantly increasing Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to 28 missions and expanding military exercises in the region. Politically, senior U.S. officials intensified their criticisms of China’s actions in the SCS, condemning militarization, coercive behavior, and violations of international law. The U.S. also emphasized that it would not sacrifice its interests in the SCS for a trade or tariff deal with China. Additionally, Washington responded swiftly to some incidents in the SCS, such as the HD-08 oil rig incident in 2019.[3] The U.S. also began promoting minilateral groupings like the Quad and AUKUS.
On the legal front, for the first time, the U.S. formally declared its stance on the SCS (on July 13, 2020), rejecting China’s claims over Vanguard Bank (off the coast of Vietnam), Luconia Shoals, and Scarborough Shoal, and initiated the “battle of diplomatic notes” at the United Nations. Economically, in August 2020, the U.S. for the first time imposed sanctions on China for the latter’s activities in the SCS, including sanctions on 24 companies and individuals involved in artificial island construction and placing China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) on a blacklist (December 2021).[4]
Second, the adjustments to U.S. SCS policy made under the Biden Administration could be inherited and modified by Trump 2.0. These changes stemmed from bipartisan consensus and the pragmatic nature of U.S. foreign policy, therefore could be maintained under Trump 2.0.
Specifically, U.S. engagement in the SCS under Biden differed from Trump 1.0’s in intensity and tactics, rather than strategic directions. On the ground, the U.S. reduced the frequency of FONOPs (from 10 in 2020 to just one in 2024) but increased “integrated deterrence” activities such as expanding military bases, deploying more assets, and experimenting with new tactics like joint patrols with coast guard vessels, light aircraft carrier exercises, enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA) operations, and extending activities in the seabed and cyberspace. On the political and diplomatic front, the U.S. under Biden tended to encourage partners to cooperate in the form of “networked alliances,” revitalize traditional alliances instead of emphasizing on free-riding and burden-sharing, and issue stronger, more immediate statements in response to incidents in the SCS.
In terms of public information, the U.S. deliberately criticized China’s domestic maritime laws and leveraged academic channels to increase transparency regarding China’s activities in the region. On the legal front, the U.S. utilized UNCLOS and international law to issue the “Limits in the Seas No. 150” (LITS 150) report, rejecting China’s legal basis for straight baselines around archipelagos and the nine-dash line.[5]
Trump 2.0 cabinet and policies - The emerging factors for further observations
First, the 2024 campaign statements signal Trump 2.0’s pragmatic policy approach regarding SCS, which requires further observation on its actual implementation. Specifically, Trump has pledged to: adopt a policy of “reciprocity” (requiring Taiwan and NATO to “pay for protection”), enhance U.S. territorial defense capabilities, engage in fierce competition with China while swiftly ending conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, increase defense budgets, and (potentially) withdraw the U.S. from multilateral agreements. These statements may signal U.S. approach to the SCS under Trump 2.0, as he still needs to demonstrate credibility and commitment to his campaign promises to a certain extent.
Notably, China policy is emphasized in Project 2025—a policy document prepared for Trump 2.0 by over 100 organizations and 400 conservative figures, including former Trump 1.0 officials. The document adopts a more extreme anti-China stance than that under Biden and Trump 1.0, calling China as a “totalitarian enemy”, deeming Asia is the “starting point” in the battle against China, and identifying China as a most severe direct threat to U.S. allies and Taiwan within the “first island chain.” According to the project, the U.S. should pursue several directions related to the SCS. Within such a context, together with partners, the U.S. should establish a “collective defense” model within the first island chain at a cost acceptable to Americans, expand the Quad+ with new partners, enhance temporary or semi-official intelligence sharing, assist Pacific nations in combating IUU fishing and China's dual-use development projects, and conduct annual coast guard drills in the Pacific. Domestically, the U.S. should expand its naval force structure, integrate “irregular warfare” (including “gray zone” conflicts) into the National Defense Strategy, and develop tactics involving light amphibious warships in the Pacific.
Second, the Trump 2.0 administration, both in terms of key cabinet picks and early actions, shows signs of potential U.S. engagement in the SCS. Several key figures in the current U.S. administration have previously promoted or expressed interest in SCS-related issues. For instance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has extensive experience on the SCS issue, and he once proposed sanctions against Chinese activities and strongly supports U.S.-Philippines alliance [6]. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz is known for being a hardliner on China, having actively lobbied for increased U.S. naval presence in the SCS and reduced dependence on China's maritime industry [7]. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth may be influenced by former defense secretary candidate Mike Rogers, who holds strong views on countering Chinese actions in the SCS [8].
Additionally, during the first month of the Trump 2.0 administration, the U.S. exhibited initial signals of its commitment to the SCS in the political-diplomatic sphere. Specifically, the U.S.-Japan Summit Joint Statement on February 7 strongly opposed China’s “illegal claims,” “militarization of artificial islands,” and “coercive, aggressive behavior” in the SCS [9]. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also addressed SCS issues in interactions with Southeast Asian nations, including calls with Philippine Foreign Minister Malano on January 22, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono on January 22 [10], and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son on January 24, referencing China’s “aggressive behavior.” [11] Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth also spoke with his Philippine counterpart on February 5 to discuss “restoring” deterrence in the SCS [12]. Compared to Trump 1.0, Trump 2.0 has engaged more swiftly and intensely with claimant or adjacent SCS countries, using stronger rhetoric.
2. Specific Forecasts on U.S. Engagement in the SCS
Based on the aforementioned foundations, it appears that Trump 2.0's SCS policy will remain relatively unchanged. The SCS will probably continue to be part of a broader intensive competition with China, blending pragmatism with conditional commitments to allies and partners. However, in the early stages of Trump 2.0’s term, the SCS will not be a top priority as the U.S. focuses on Ukraine and the Middle East. Meanwhile, the U.S. will probably adjust policy implementation across multiple fronts, potentially impacting regional nations, including Vietnam.
On Military Domain
The U.S. may resume Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), but less if compared to Trump 1.0. Trump 1.0 frequently utilized FONOPs as a dual-purpose strategic tool—to assert international legal principles and enhance U.S. presence in the SCS. The frequency of FONOPs declined significantly under Biden, who shifted focus toward substantive military exercises and capacity-building for allies and partners. This strategic adjustment aligns with the pragmatic nature of U.S. SCS policy, suggesting that while FONOPs will persist under Trump 2.0, they will not be a primary tool as in his first term.
Trump 2.0 may introduce new security tactics, prioritizing practical operations on the ground. The U.S. may intensify joint exercises with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing light warships, unmanned systems, and coast guard vessels (as outlined in Project 2025). With the Republican majority in Congress, shipbuilding budgets and defense spending approvals will likely be smoother and more consistent than in previous periods. Additionally, the U.S. will likely focus on “irregular warfare” scenarios (gray zone conflicts), including anti-island-seizure and counter-militarization tactics, as suggested in Project 2025 [13]. The U.S. will possibly continue “integrated deterrence” model from the Biden era but may place greater emphasis on nuclear capabilities, fostering informal “collective security” (akin to Japan's recent NATO 2.0 proposal). Following tensions with Australia over nuclear submarine transfers, the U.S. may raise prices to maximize economic benefits, potentially stalling certain AUKUS activities. Additionally, the possibility of developing AUKUS 2.0 in a civilianized form to reassure regional nations cannot be ruled out.
Under Trump 2.0, U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) are expected to rise. Project 2025 notes that U.S. FMS have declined sharply (2021 FMS amounted to only three-fifths of 2018 levels), affecting U.S. alliance interoperability and its own defense industry. As a result, Trump 2.0 will target potential Indo-Pacific partners for arms and defense technology transactions, including nations traditionally importing military equipment from China and Russia, such as Vietnam. This serves to expand U.S. influence, generate FMS revenue, and integrate security partners.
Trump 2.0 is likely to continue to offer logistical support (on a transactional basis) to regional allies and partners. Given Trump’s pragmatic, deal-oriented approach, allies and partners may face increased demands for specific contributions to the U.S., such as granting base access and port visits in exchange for assistance and continuity in agreements initiated under Biden. This aligns with the “burden-sharing” principle in Project 2025.
On Political-Diplomatic Domain
Strategic documents such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and the National Security Strategy (NSS), or even a specific strategy on China, may be issued in the later years of Trump's term. However, Trump 2.0's IPS may seek to frame the U.S.-China conflict in a more confrontational manner while ensuring that allies in the EU and the Middle East are not neglected (a scenario where Trump 2.0 issues separate regional strategies should not be ruled out). During this process, the U.S. may also push for the Quad and other allies to release similar statements.
Key leaders in the Trump 2.0 administration may also escalate public criticism of China with new narratives. This trend was evident during Trump 1.0, when senior officials such as Vice President Mike Pence, National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo deliberately condemned China in late 2019. The criticism could expand to include elements from Project 2025, such as condemning illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and gray zone activities, rejecting China's new claims and domestic laws, and supporting new legal cases by the Philippines.
However, there exists several possibilities for Trump 2.0’s reduced political engagement in the SCS. First, Trump's lack of commitment to or withdrawal from multilateral mechanisms could weaken U.S. credibility and its ability to mobilize allies and partners in the region. This would provide China with opportunities to play a larger role in regional and global governance, especially as China actively strengthens ties with ASEAN nations such as Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, and Malaysia, while expanding its influence over “Global South” countries through BRICS and other global initiatives. Second, it cannot be ruled out is that Trump could “trade off” certain interests in the SCS to pursue personal, economic or strategic gains with China, similar to the Ukraine scenario. However, great-power competition and the strong anti-China sentiment within the U.S. can offset the conditions for such possibilities.
On Economic Domain
The U.S. may strengthen defense trade and maritime infrastructure investments to both compete with China's regional development projects and reduce the trade deficit. Trump could continue prioritizing his favorite “three Ts”: Trade, Team, and Transactions—focusing on trade, prioritizing group-based cooperation, and emphasizing transactional deals. As part of this strategy, agreements on arms transfers, defense technology cooperation, military base expansion, and maritime infrastructure development will possibly take precedence over non-profitable aid packages. The U.S. may also pressure partners to avoid using Chinese maritime assets, such as port management systems, cranes, submarine cables, and green energy infrastructure. Previously, the U.S. repeatedly accused China's LOGINK port management system of security risks and passed legislation restricting ZPMC cranes in domestic ports. This trend becomes even more feasible as China also moves toward “decoupling” from the U.S. in maritime economic sectors.
Additionally, Trump 2.0 may adjust his stance on climate change and offshore energy cooperation if he sees economic potential. In this case, green technology and energy projects could be endorsed by major U.S. corporations such as Elon Musk’s Tesla, particularly in areas like green port development, electric vehicles, green technology applications, and sustainable supply chains. These are also fields in which China has taken the lead and invested heavily through its “Made in China 2025” industrial policy. Any adjustments by Trump could intensify overall U.S.-China competition in the fields of energy and green technology.
On Legal Domain
The U.S. may reinforce its legal stance on the SCS to counter new Chinese claims and establish a legacy for Trump 2.0. Trump 1.0 was the first administration to issue an official U.S. position on the SCS. However, since then, Washington has not updated its stance, only issuing standalone statements on new developments in the region. A revised position under Trump 2.0 could clarify U.S. views on key disputed features such as Scarborough Shoal, Vanguard Bank, and Second Thomas Shoal, as well as new unilateral Chinese actions such as new baselines in the Gulf of Tonkin and around Scarborough Shoal. It could also specify the conditions under which the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty would be triggered – a topic attracted multiple discourses after China – Philippine standoff series in 2023-2024. Additionally, the State Department may issue a new Limits in the Seas (LITS) report, refute China's new claims, new domestic laws, and emerging gray zone activities.
On Informational Domain
The U.S. may aim for more flexible intelligence-sharing mechanisms on maritime security through groupings such as Quad+ or Nine Eyes. Project 2025 mentions the possibility of upgrading the Five Eyes intelligence alliance into Nine Eyes. To reduce the sensitivity of maritime domain awareness (MDA) projects in the SCS, the U.S. could integrate Quad’s IPMDA initiative with maritime information-sharing projects from other allies, such as Canada’s Dark Vessel Detection Program, the UK’s Skylight project, New Zealand’s Starboard initiative, or the EU’s CRIMARIO project.
The U.S. is also likely to enhance anti-China propaganda through Track 1.5 and Track 2 initiatives, especially as Project 2025 mobilizes a network of over 100 Republican-aligned research institutions, led by the Heritage Foundation, followed by the Pacific Research Institute, Turning Points USA, and the Center for Military Readiness.
Conclusion
In general, U.S. policy on the SCS is influenced by a multitude of internal and external factors and is integrated into its broader strategy toward China and the region. Under Trump 2.0, the U.S. might still safeguard its core strategic interests, including freedom of navigation, maintaining its concept of “rules-based order”, reinforcing commitments to allies and partners, and “inheriting the legacy” of both the Trump 1.0 and Biden administrations. However, the level of attention given to the SCS will depend on the overall state of U.S.-China relations, U.S. resource availability, developments in other global hotspots—particularly in Europe and the Middle East — and the priorities of individual U.S. leaders.
Ngan Mai Hoang
Translated by NNDH
*The views expressed in this article are solely of the author
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