South China Sea in 2024 - 2025: “Strong Currents” on Multiple Fronts

 

 

In 2024, the South China Sea witnessed many remarkable developments across multiple domains, bearing characteristics of both cooperation and competition trends.

 

 

First, China, the Philippines and Vietnam took decisive steps to clarify their claims in the South China Sea. Some possibly aimed to align their claims more closely with international law or to strengthen the foundation for maritime cooperation, while others might have wanted to utilize the so-called “legal warfare”.

To be specific, in 2024, the Philippines submitted for the first time its extended continental shelf claim beyond 200 nautical miles west of Palawan to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). While noting that the submission might overlap with the submissions of Vietnam and Malaysia, the Philippines also underscored its readiness for discussion on delimitation of the sea with relevant nations [2]. In November 2024, the Philippines enacted the Maritime Zone Act and the Archipelago Sea Lanes Act, which for the first time introduced maritime boundaries in accordance with the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award [3] and the archipelago's sea lanes. Such moves immediately received endorsement from the United States [4] and were praised by some observers as efforts to make Philippine claims more aligned with UNCLOS [5].

 

Meanwhile, China introduced two new territorial sea baselines in 2024. The first was in the northern Gulf of Tonkin on March 1. On November 10, seemingly as a response to the Philippine’s two new laws (as mentioned above), China announced the second one around Scarborough Shoal [6], along with “standard” designations of 64 features in the South China Sea [7] (mostly located within the Philippines' EEZ) and a new map of what China calls “Sansha City” [8] (which includes the new baseline around Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Dao). The new baselines could be used to reinforce China's legal justification for further deployement there.

 

For its part, in 2024, Vietnam for the first time submitted its extended continental shelf limit beyond 200 nautical miles for the central area in the South China Sea on July 18 [9]. This marked Vietnam's third submission to the CLCS so far.

 

Secondly, the international community’s support for the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award appeared to be persistent, indicating the value of the Award and its role as a legal basis on which positions regarding events in the South China Sea were built upon. Particularly, in addition to the Philippines, at least 17 other government actors [10] voiced their endorsement for the Award. Governmental agencies’ statements include those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as the US [11], Australia [12], the EU [13], New Zealand [14] and Japan [15]. Some were made at the Embassy level in the Philippines such as the UK [16], South Korea [17], Canada [18], France [19], Germany [20], Norway [21], Denmark [22], The Netherlands [23], Poland [24], Sweden [25], Italy [26] and the Czech Republic [27]. Remarkably, the U.S. put forward a supporting statement via its Department of State, of which content is stronger than its counterpart in the previous year. Specifically, the U.S. not only affirmed the value of the Award and urged China to uphold its obligations under international law but also condemned China's “dangerous and destructive” actions against the Philippines in the South China Sea [28]. Furthermore, both the joint statements of the Quad Summit in September 2024 [29] and the Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 2024 [30] deemed Arbitral Tribunal Award as the basis for peaceful dispute resolution between concerned parties, thus marking the first time the Quad explicitly recognized the value of the Award in high-level statements.

 

 

 

China was accused of obstructing Philippine activities at four main “hot spots”, a notable increase from 2023 (which saw tensions concentrating at only two spots). At Second Thomas Shoal, on June 17, a Chinese coast guard vessel for the first time implemented its new Coast Guard Law to board and conduct an “investigation” of a Philippine ship, leaving a Philippine crew member injured [31]. The incident attracted significant public attention. At Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal, on December 4, Chinese coast guard ships allegedly sprayed water cannon at a Philippine official vessel [32], and on August 8, Chinese Air Force was accused of using flares against a Philippine patrol aircraft [33]. At Sabina Shoal, a Chinese coast guard vessel was accused of deliberately spraying water cannons at a Philippine supply ship on August 25 [34] and ramming a Philippine Fisheries Administration ship on August 31 [35]. At Iroquois Reef, on 27 November, Chinese helicopters and coast guard vessels reportedly “clashed with” PLP fishing vessels [36].

 

On September 29, in the Paracel Islands, a Chinese patrol boat allegedly attacked a Vietnamese fishing boat, causing damage to Vietnamese fishermen [37]. On October 16-27, Chinese coast guard continuously confronted Indonesian forces in the Natuna Sea, allegedly “disrupting” the survey activities of Indonesia’s Pertamina Oil and Gas Company [38].

 

Second, several countries – both claimants and non-claimaints to the South China Sea dispute – continue to enhance their deterrence activities starting from 2022-2023. Rough data based on open sources show that China increased the frequency of its military exercises in the South China Sea, conducting approximately 74 exercises from July to November 2024, nearly double the 37 exercises in the same period in 2023) [39]. Notably, China for the first time deployed two aircraft carrier formations in 2024 [40]. Meanwhile, U.S. military presence seemingly decreased, with only two Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) [41] and four aircraft carrier dispatchments into the South China Sea in 2024, compared to three FONOPs and six aircraft carrier deployments in 2023. Nevertheless, U.S. deterrence capability in the South China Sea might not deteriorate significantly as the country in 2024 carried out many new exercises with its regional partners, including eight Maritime Cooperation Activities (MCAs) with the Philippines in the South China Sea from November 2023 to November 2024. Some other “middle powers” such as Japan, Canada or New Zealand also participated in the MCA in the South China Sea for the first time with the Philippines and the U.S.[42][43][44]

 

 

 

The U.S. reacted promptly and strongly to the incidents involving the Philippines. By the end of August 2024, the U.S. Department of State had issued four statements [45] (on March 5 [46], March 23 [47], June 17 [48] and August 31 [49]) following the clashes at Second Thomas Shoal, using the word “condemn” to respond to China’s acts. After the June 17 incident, for the first time, both the [50] U.S. Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State [51] held phone talks with their Filipino counterparts to reaffirm U.S. commitment to defend the Philippines under the Mutual Defense Treaty.

 

Also, for the first time, the G7 summit [52] condemned China's use of militia and coast guard forces in the South China Sea, expressing “deep concern” over the increasing number of dangerous actions against Philippine ships.

 

Furthermore, the Joint Statement of the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting not only directly mentioned China but also took a stronger stance on the South China Sea situation. Accordingly, the statement “strongly oppose(d)” all unilateral efforts to change the status quo, and indicated that Quad nations were “deeply concerned” about the militarization of features in the South China Sea and the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militias. It is worth noting that the South China Sea was not mentioned in in last year's Declaration of the Meeting [53]. England [54], Japan [55], Canada [56], Australia [57], South Korea [58] and the EU also deliberately voiced their support for the Philippines in incidents such as at Second Thomas Shoal.

 

Particularly, following the clash between China’s forces and Vietnamese fishermen, some “middle” countries such as Australia [59], New Zealand [60] and Canada [61] voiced their concerns – mainly through representative agencies in Vietnam –but did not directly criticize China. The U.S. State Department [62] spoke out more strongly about the incident than the abovementioned countries, stating that the US was “extremely concerned” by the “dangerous action” of Chinese ships against Vietnamese fishing vessels, urging China to stop such dangerous and unstable behavior in the South China Sea.

 

In addition, China and Southeast Asian countries made notable progress in many bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation. China and Indonesia held their first dialogue on maritime issues, agreeing on joint consensus on joint exploitation in “overlapping” waters (although this word use caused much controversy within Indonesia about its position in the South China Sea). Similar dialogues were held with Malaysia and Brunei [63]. China and the Philippines, despite many on-site “collisions”, still reached a consensus on reducing tensions at the Second Thomas Shoal through the bilateral consultation mechanism [64]. China and Vietnam’s leaders also agreed to turn the South China Sea into a sea of cooperation. China and ASEAN continued their dialogue on the Code of Conduct, organizing the 22nd SOM-DOC Conference in China [65].

 

 

In 2024, the Philippines and China promoted a strategy of “transparency” regarding their collisions in the South China Sea. The Philippine’s Armed Forces and West Sea National Task Force quickly released videos of the incidents at Second Thomas Shoal and Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal [67] respectively, with evidence condemning the Chinese air force [68] and coast guard’s dangerous behaviors [69] in the South China Sea. On the contrary, China also presented its own evidence and statements, accusing the Philippines of being the aggressor [70], disrespecting the “Gentlemen Agreement” reached with China [71], being manipulated by external forces to escalate tension the South China Sea [72], and using “transparency strategy” to sway public opinion [73].

 

Additionally, a notable trend emerged as governments, academic settings and the media published numerous articles on Vietnam's on-site activities, comparing them to those of China. The Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (AMTI/CSIS) produced several reports on Vietnam's island reclamation activities in the Spratlys [74]. These reports, cited by major US newspapers such as the Washington Post [75] or the Wall Street Journal [76], generated a strong public opinion effect in 2024. There was an increase in official government responses to Vietnam's activities (including from the Philippines and Malaysia), as well as a rise in scholarly and media commentaries from European, Chinese and Filipino newspapers. The content of these commentaries also became diverse covering not only reclamation activities under Chinese pressure but also environmental impacts, comparisons of reclamation activities among Vietnam, China and the Philippines, and China's reaction to these activities.

 

 

In the coming year, the situation in the South China Sea will continue to be influenced by the actions of China and the United States, shaped by regional policies and internal political factors of these two countries. These actions will be considered and adjusted in the context of relations with ASEAN countries and neutral powers, thereby affecting regional strategy and security relations. This article considers the following factors as a basis for forecasting: (i) internal factors in China and the United States that affect their policy attitudes/stances towards the South China Sea; (ii) policies that the two countries will implement in the region; (iii) the policies of stakeholders such as ASEAN or other “middle power”.

 

 

 

Regarding the U.S., the Trump 2.0 administration has introduced candidates for key positions, many of whom have a deep understanding of, and interest in, the South China Sea or hold a tough stance on China. For example, Secretary of State candidate Marco Rubio once submitted a draft of the “South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act [77] “, targeting Chinese individuals, corporations, and companies involved in island reclamation activities in the South China Sea [78]. National Security Advisor candidate Mike Waltz [79] is also known for regularly criticizing China's activities in the Indo-Pacific region [80]. He even sent a letter urging the US president to increase naval presence in the region due to China's expanding influence in the South China Sea [81]. Although Trump did not mention the South China Sea in his presidential campaign promises [82], he emphasized the need to compete strongly with China. In addition, there is a bipartisan consensus regarding the U.S.’s competition with China, especially with the Republican Party holding a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

 

For China, the country might act more assertively in the South China Sea, especially in early 2025, to “test” the Trump administration's response, similar to China’s approach during Trump’s first term [83]. China might also seek to counter the U.S. “derisking/decoupling” strategy [84], or to divert attention to away from China’s defense apparatus adjustments [85]. In addition, other political, economic and military factors could further drive this trend.

 

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasized the country’s determination to promote the “Maritime Power Strategy”, highlighting “national security” in its overall foreign policy [86]. The goal of enabling naval control over areas beyond the “first and second island chains” is believed to be planned for the 2020-2050 period.

 

China continues to have a significant demand for energy, which could potentially incentivize the country to expand mining operations in its southern waters [87], including the South China Sea. In terms of military capabilities, the gap between China and the U.S. is narrowing. In 2024, China deployed multiple anti-stealth radar systems at its South China Sea bases [88], successfully tested submarine detectors with a range of 20 km also in the South China Sea [89], and built three nuclear submarines equipped new-generation cruise missiles [90].

 

 

In 2025, the U.S. is likely to maintain its Indo-Pacific Strategy (related to the South China Sea) but in ways that are coherent with Project 2025 – a policy prepared for Trump 2.0 by over 100 organizations and 400 conservative figures, including former officials from the Trump 1.0 administration. The document adopts a more extreme anti-China line than the policies under Biden and Trump 1.0, labelling China as “totalitarian enemy”, the Chinese Communist Party as a perpetrator of “genocide”, and deeming cooperative policies with China might have been doomed. Project 2025 identifies Asia as a “starting point” in the war against Communist China and considers China as a severe threat against U.S. allies and Taiwan within the “first island chain”.

 

Accordingly, Project 2025 proposes several directions related to the South China Sea that the US will need to pursue. For partners, the US needs to establish a model “collective defense” in the first island chain though at a cost acceptable to Americans; promote Quad+ with new partners; increase temporary or semi-official intelligence sharing with partners; assist Pacific nations in combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and China's dual-use technology development projecst; and conduct annual coast guard exercises in the Pacific.

 

Domestically, the U.S. will realize the need to expand its naval forces structure, incorporate “irregular warfare” (including “gray zone warfare”) in the National Defense Strategy, and develop tactics involving light amphibious warships in the Pacific.

 

For China, in 2025, the country will still prioritize the South China Sea region in its global strategies, increasing both competition and cooperation. Specifically, China will continue to promote the implementation of the “Global Security Initiative” (GSI), “Global Development Initiative” (GDI), “Global Civilization Initiative” (GCI) and the Community of Common Destiny, starting with countries in the South China Sea region [91].

 

China considers Southeast Asia as a crucial link in its strategy to connect with the “Global South” countries to advance a multipolar order or establish new poles of influence [92], encouraging countries to join groups like BRICS. China will probably view South China Sea in relation to other adjacent seas such as the East China Sea or the Yellow Sea, as part of its Maritime Power Strategy to 2030.

 

 

 

For Western “middle powers”, regional hotspots elsewhere might drive two opposing attitudes among such countries towards the South China Sea situation. On the one hand, the middle powers could reduce attention or involvement in the South China Sea, as their stretched resources must be allocated to other hotspots as well. On the other hand, the middle powers might increase their focus on the South China Sea in tandem with other hotspots, viewing them all as indications of the rule of law or the so-called “rules-based order”.

 

An example of the latter trend was evident during the 16th South China Sea International Conference hosted by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. During the event, EEAS Director-General for Asia-Pacific Niclas Kvarnström said that Indo-Pacific and European security are “more interconnected than ever”, citing North Korea's support for Russia in Ukraine and the challenges “gray zone” tactics faced by both the South China Sea and the Red Sea. Canadian Deputy Defense Minister Scott Miller emphasized that the South China Sea is “one of the key security hotspots” for Canada, and that the country plans to link the South China Sea with the Black Sea and Red Sea [93].

 

 

The Philippines might strengthen defense cooperation with the West and the other middle powers. Meanwhile, Malaysia may seek maritime cooperation with China to a certain extent, but such cooperation will not affect the former’s 2025 ASEAN Chairmanship. Indonesia and Singapore could take a more “pragmatic” approach towards major powers, as in 2024, Indonesia issued a joint statement with China which somehow recognized “overlapping” claims of the two nations while Singapore was the only ASEAN member to join the U.S.-endorsed joint statement on undersea cables at the United Nations. Nevertheless, both Indonesia and Singapore reaffirmed that their collaborative activities would not undermine their “leading” roles in ASEAN.

 

 

With regard to on-site developments, in 2025, the US is likely to change its engagement tactics in the South China Sea. FONOPs under Trump 2.0 might be revitalized to demonstrate U.S. military power in line with Project 2025. However, the number of FONOPs is unlikely to reach the record levels during Trump 1.0, as resources might be redirected toward other deterrence activities. Trump 2.0 could advance new tactics involving light vessels, unmanned vehicles and coast guard ships (as outlined in Project 2025), deploy new military assets to bases in the Philippines at an acceptable cost, and focus on “irregular warfare” (a priority in Project 2025). The U.S. might also encourage allies and partners to conduct their own exercises while the U.S. providing logistical support.

 

China might continue its assertive actions against the Philippines through “gray zone” tactics in early 2025 to “test” the new U.S. administration, albeit with reduced frequency compared to 2024. The focus might shift from Second Thomas Shoal to Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao), allowing China to further concretize its new baseline and respond to new developments resulting from the two Philippine laws.

 

Southeast Asian and other middle powers might continue to participate in maritime capacity building activities led by the U.S and its allies and become more confident in conducting intra-bloc exercises.

 

On the legal front, the U.S. might adjust its legal stance on the South China Sea to oppose new Chinese claims and leave a legacy for Trump 2.0, similar to the first explicit U.S. position on the South China Sea during Trump 1.0. The new stance could clarify the U.S. views on key features in recent disputes (for example Scarborough Shoal, Vanguard Bank or Second Thomas Shoal) and China's unilateral actions (such as a new baselines in the Gulf of Tonkin and Scarborough Shoal). It might also make clearer the conditions for activating the 1951 Mutal Defense Treaty with the Philippines.

 

China is likely to push for domestic legislations to prepare for the establishment of baselines around “Four Shas” as well as internal laws related to the South China Sea which serve China’s economic competition with the U.S. (e.g., separate laws on seaports, submarine cables, or maritime infrastructure). Meanwhile, ASEAN is expected continue advancing COC negotiations, with an aim to complete the third reading before 2026.

 

Diplomacy wise, China is likely to persist with its neighbor-oriented diplomacy and bilateral dialogues with ASEAN member states to promote joint development initiatives. Meanwhile, in the U.S., key cabinet figures under Trump 2.0 might intensify their criticism of China, incorporating new connotations. This trend was evident during Trump 1.0, as senior officials such as Vice President Mike Pence [94], National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien [95] and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo all criticized China in late 2019 [96]. The new criticisms might include topics such as IUU and “gray zone” activities, China's new claims and internal laws as well as support for new Philippine legal actions, all of which are incorporated in Project 2025. In his upcoming term, Trump might also prepare for new strategic documents such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), the National Security Strategy (NSS) or even a separate strategic document on China.

 

On the information domain, China and the Philippines will likely continue to be “transparency strategies” against each other (with the Philippines supported by the U.S.). The U.S. could aim to share on-site maritime intelligence in a more flexible manner through the Quad+ or Nine Eyes network (upgraded from Five Eyes as suggested in Project 2025). To reduce the sensitivity of maritime domain awareness (MDAs) projects in the South China Sea, the U.S. could integrate the Quad's Regional Marine Awareness Initiative (IPMDA) with allied private maritime information projects such as as Canada’s Dark Vessel Detection Program, the United Kingdom’s Skylight, New Zealand’s Starboard or the EU’s CRIMARIO.

 

 

The South China Sea in 2024 faced “strong currents” stemming from unprecedented developments and trends, such as further legal clarification (alongside further “legal warfare” deployment) of key disputing parties; increased scope and frequency of maritime collisions; more military deterrence activities by main stakeholders; and heightened divergence in political, diplomatic and informational narratives.

 

In the coming year, the South China Sea is likely to remain not only an issue among claimants, but also affected by China and the U.S., driven by their domestic and regional policies as well as the policies of Southeast Asian countries and other “middle powers”. Therefore, the South China Sea will continue to be a theater for major power competition, potentially connected with other global hotspots via the "rule-based order" framing, and characterized by "gray zone" tactics and military deterrence activities. Within such a context, ASEAN is expected to play a balancing role between great powers in the region./.

 

 

1. Research Fellow, South China Sea Institute (Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam). The views expressed in this article are solely of the author.
2. https://nghiencuubiendong.vn/dien-bien-phap-ly-moi-tren-bien-dong-philippines-de-trinh-them-luc-dia-mo-rong-len-uy-ban-ranh-gioi-them-luc-dia-lien-hop-quoc.56572.anews.
3. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1237378.
4. https://www.state.gov/on-the-philippines-maritime-zones-act/.
5. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-philippines-made-dramatic-turnaround-question-archipelagos-law-sea.
6. http://www.news.cn/politics/20241110/103c17f8045b472a9286454d91262157/c.html.
7. http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16350825.html.
8. https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20241112A042O100.
9. https://en.baochinhphu.vn/viet-nams-submission-on-extended-continental-shelf-beyond-200-nautical-miles-is-appropriate-with-unclos-111240718180411193.htm.
10. Data and statistics provided by the Centre for International Law, SCSI (Lan Huong; Thanh Thao, Hong Minh & Minh Ha).
11. https://www.state.gov/eighth-anniversary-of-the-philippines-prc-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-ruling/.
12. https://x.com/AusAmbPH/status/1811653276246638656/photo/2
13. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/south-china-sea-statement-spokesperson-anniversary-award-rendered-arbitration-between-philippines_en.
14. https://x.com/MFATNZ/status/1811597490619318503
15. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00430.html.
16. https://x.com/ukinphilippines/status/1811611674815918124?s=54
17. https://x.com/koreanembassyph/status/1811739208173912198?s=54
18. https://x.com/AmbDBHartman
19. https://x.com/frenchembassyph/status/1811605633227215097?s=54
20. https://x.com/germanyinphl/status/1811573369147670554?s=54
21. https://x.com/norwayambmnl/status/1811569334466269418?s=54
22. https://x.com/DenmarkinPH/status/1811564415671816446
23. https://x.com/geraedtsmariel/status/1811593324773658998?s=46&t=FaULGG5n74MaCHW_1GaGAw
24. https://x.com/PLinManila/status/1811599003609706867
25. https://x.com/swedeninmanila/status/1811566657703412079?s=54
26. https://x.com/italyinph/status/1811663193040978430?s=54
27. https://x.com/czambmanila/status/1811544674735415299?s=54
28. See Footnote 12.
29. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/09/21/the-wilmington-declaration-joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-australia-india-japan-and-the-united-states/.
30. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-from-the-quad-foreign-ministers-meeting-in-tokyo/.
31. https://nghiencuubiendong.vn/vu-va-cham-giua-trung-quoc-va-philippines-tai-bai-co-may-dien-bien-va-he-luy.56593.anews.
32. https://vnexpress.net/tau-cong-vu-philippines-trung-quoc-va-cham-gan-bai-can-scarborough-4823918.html#:~:text=B%C3%A3i%20c%E1%BA%A1n%20Scarborough%20l%C3%A0%20r%E1%BA%A1n,c%E1%BA%A1n%20n%C3%A0y%20t%E1%BB%AB%20n%C4%83m%202012.
33. https://thanhnien.vn/philippines-cao-buoc-khong-quan-trung-quoc-quay-roi-may-bay-tren-bai-can-scarborough-185240810162603252.htm.
34. https://tuoitre.vn/philippines-to-8-tau-hai-canh-trung-quoc-bam-sat-phun-voi-rong-vao-tau-tiep-te-20240825171659447.htm
35. https://tuoitre.vn/nong-tau-trung-quoc-va-philippines-dam-nhau-tren-bien-dong-20240831162308449.htm
36. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/12/03/asia-pacific/politics/china-philippines-ships-reef/
37. https://vnexpress.net/viet-nam-yeu-cau-tha-ngay-ngu-dan-bi-bat-tren-bien-dong-4810743.html.
38. https://tuoitre.vn/indonesia-hai-lan-xua-duoi-tau-trung-quoc-tai-vung-bien-bac-natuna-20241024151055418.htm.
39. Statistics and data from the Centre for Chinese Studies, SCSI (Hoang Lan; Dang Duong; Nhat Linh; Le Quyen & Khanh Trong)
40. https://military.cctv.com/2024/11/01/ARTIzxvFQDMNXyyhEepRJ6Ug241101.shtml.
41. https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/3771278/us-navy-destroyer-conducts-freedom-of-navigation-operation-in-the-south-china-s/.
42. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/08/02/2374959/philippines-japan-hold-first-joint-drills-west-philippine-sea.
43. https://www-abs--cbn-com.translate.goog/news/2024/8/7/aus-can-us-ph-exercise-1724
44. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/2024/9/28/ph-holds-joint-drills-with-australia-japan-new-zealand-and-us-in-philippine-waters-850
45. Statistic and data from the Central for American Studies, SCSI (Do Ngan; Ngoc Mai; Hop Chau & Khanh Nam).
46. https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea-8.
47. https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea-9.
48. https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea-10.
49. https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea-12/.
50. https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-manalo-5/.
51. https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-campbells-call-with-philippine-undersecretary-of-foreign-affairs-lazaro/.
52. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/14/g7-leaders-statement-8/.
53. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/quad-foreign-ministers-meeting-joint-statement-tokyo.
54. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/fcdo-statement-on-the-south-china-sea
55. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00377.html
56. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/06/canada-condemns-actions-by-peoples-republic-of-china-against-philippine-vessels-in-south-china-sea.html
57. https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/statement-regarding-recent-incidents-south-china-sea
58. https://x.com/KoreanEmbassyPH/status/1802907846243488165
59. https://x.com/AusAmbVN/status/1842139269684682945
60. https://x.com/nzinvietnam/status/1842027048694636996
61. https://x.com/ShawnSteil/status/1841999434605076899?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR1x376Gh3fBcTjCnjmvXINh5OAwUMTb8kpUjJMZBJfow9sDpGk1S2_08EQ_aem_IUiqhG7YS_MvOc6Tboqsqg
62. https://x.com/StateDeptSpox/status/1841998593538089158
63. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/202411/t20241109_11524047.shtml.
64. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbxw_new/202407/t20240702_11446084.shtml.
65. https://asean.org/22nd-asean-china-som-doc-convenes-in-the-ancient-city-of-xian-china/.
66. https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1803547421399720267
67. https://hongkongfp.com/2024/08/25/philippines-accuses-china-of-firing-flares-at-its-south-china-sea-plane/.
68. https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1822881622360019260?lang=en
69. https://www.manilatimes.net/2024/08/25/videos/watch-china-vessels-ram-water-cannon-ph-ship/1966656.
70. https://www.asiamediacentre.org.nz/sabina-shoal-new-china-philippines-flashpoint-in-south-china-sea.
71. https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20240523A05C6I00?suid=&media_id.
72. https://news.cctv.com/2024/07/11/ARTIBF0ZwgKBD1yVcVojtUAl240711.shtml.
73. https://news.sina.cn/2024-06-28/detail-incafpmy6466574.d.html.
74. https://amti.csis.org/hanoi-in-high-gear-vietnams-spratly-expansion-accelerates/
75. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/vietnam-south-china-sea-islands-growth/.
76. https://www.wsj.com/video/series/news-explainers/vietnam-is-rapidly-building-artificial-land-in-the-shadows-of-china/5C3022D2-F396-4B9A-9895-8217E8B634BD
77. https://www.rubio.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/_cache/files/f3e4a93c-68b1-41d9-aca4-edcf30df461f/B2D5942E2DC2A48C4119E9DD2705C920.rubiocardinsouthchinasea.pdf
78. https://nghiencuubiendong.vn/du-luat-trung-phat-trung-quoc-o-bien-dong-va-bien-hoa-dong.6891.adata.
79. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/11/politics/mike-waltz-national-security-adviser/index.html.
80. https://apnews.com/article/trump-defense-secretary-pentagon-nomination-59657362d8bb5b6bf245def8611e7a0f.
81. https://waltz.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=866.
82. https://www.politifact.com/article/2024/sep/30/donald-trumps-2024-campaign-promises-heres-his-vis/?form=MG0AV3.
83. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-china-finishing-south-china-sea-buildings-that-could-house-missiles--idUSKBN161029/
84. https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/07/04/southeast-asia-hedges-between-feasibility-and-desirability/
85. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/dong-jun-miao-hua-china-pla-purge-xi-jinping-4791276
86. http://hochiminhcity.china-consulate.gov.cn/xwdt/202210/t20221026_10792286.html.
87. https://amti.csis.org/almost-everyone-is-drilling-inside-the-nine-dash-line/
88. https://maritime-executive.com/article/china-puts-anti-stealth-radar-system-on-strategic-s-china-sea-island.
89. https://vtcnews.vn/trung-quoc-thu-nghiem-thanh-cong-may-do-tau-ngam-pham-vi-20-km-tren-bien-dong-ar897230.html
90. https://vtcnews.vn/trung-quoc-thu-nghiem-thanh-cong-may-do-tau-ngam-pham-vi-20-km-tren-bien-dong-ar897230.html.
91. https://www.qdnd.vn/quoc-te/tin-tuc/trung-quoc-cong-bo-sach-trang-ve-quan-he-quoc-te-744380
92. https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2023/11/13/chinas-leaders-will-seek-to-exploit-global-divisions-in-2024.
93. 16th South China Sea Conference of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
94. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-frederic-v-malek-memorial-lecture/.
95. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/04/asean-summit-us-condemns-chinese-intimidation-in-the-south-china-sea.
96. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-thailand-pompeo/pompeo-blasts-chinese-coercion-in-south-china-sea-idUSKCN1UR4D2/.