Trends in Southeast Asian people’s perception of the region in recent years: Results from the ISEAS’s surveys since 2019

Hải Đăng

The annual State of Southeast Asia Survey of the Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) from Singapore is a survey about the recent geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia. The survey is conducted over 1.000 Southeast Asians from various fields of occupations (research, business, civil society, regional or international organizations) to get people’s views and assessments on regional situations, global hotspots, major power competition as well as new alliances and global initiatives. After being published, the survey’ results are highly sought after and covered by many regional news outlets like the Borneo Bulletin, the Australian, and the Japan Times.

Since the first State of Southeast Asia Survey was published in 2019, the ISEAS has conducted five annual surveys, with the most recent being completed in February 2023.[1] This article compares the results of these surveys over the years and assesses the trends in Southeast Asians’ perception of the current regional geopolitical situation. The article later points out respondents' outlooks that have remained stable or unchanged throughout the past four years, and some issues of which the respondents' perceptions have apparently changed.

Consistent views since 2019

The respondents' views regarding concerns about ASEAN, China’s influence, and the role of middle powers remained unchanged throughout the five surveys.

The second greatest concern of ASEAN is the organization becoming an arena of major power competition: Among the concerns about ASEAN such as: ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxies; ASEAN is becoming increasingly disunited; ASEAN is elitist and disconnected from ordinary people; ASEAN is slow and ineffective, and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments; ASEAN is unable to overcome current pandemic challenges; ASEAN is becoming irrelevant in the new world order; ASEAN’s tangible benefits are not felt by Southeast Asian people, that ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition is always the second most worrying concern of respondents in all five surveys. Particularly, in the 2019 and 2020 surveys, this concern ranked behind the concern about ASEAN’s tangible benefits not being felt by the people; while in the 2021, 2022, and 2023 surveys, this concern has ranked behind the concern about ASEAN being slow and ineffective, and thus it could not cope with fluid political and economic developments.[2]

China is the most influential strategic, political, and economic power in Southeast Asia, but is not trusted to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance: In all five surveys, the majority of respondents believe that China is the most influential strategic, political, and economic power in Southeast Asia (in comparison with the United States, the European Union, Russia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and ASEAN).[3] However, most are not confident that China will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance.[4]

ASEAN should not pick a side in the US-China rivalry: Since the 2020 survey, the ISEAS has recurrently posed a question to the respondents: How should ASEAN respond in the context of the US-China competition in Southeast Asia? There are five answers from the respondents: (1) ASEAN has to seek out “third parties” to broaden its strategic space and options; (2) ASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers; (3) ASEAN should continue its position of not siding with China or the US; (4) ASEAN has to choose between one of the two major powers as remaining neutral is impractical; and (5) ASEAN needs to prevent China and the US from negatively influencing the region. The answer repeatedly chosen by most respondents is that ASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers, followed by that ASEAN should continue its position of not siding with China or the US.[5]

Trusting Japan but not India: A continuing trend in the respondents’ answers is that SEA has increased its trust in Japan (among the major powers like China, the US, Japan, the EU, and India) to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. Additionally, India, despite being an important nation to Southeast Asia and expected to counter China, seems to not yet be a convincing leader to the respondents by what India has shown.[6] Since 2020, the ISEAS has also asked the respondents why they trust or distrust a country. Regarding Japan, the reason why this country is trusted the most is that it is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law. Meanwhile, as for India, the two most popular reasons for the majority’s distrust of India are: India does not have the capacity or political will for global leadership, and India is distracted with its internal affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues.

The US and the UK are the most preferred destinations for studying abroad: Throughout all five surveys, the US and the UK have been the respondents’ top choices for tertiary education among the listed countries and regions, which are the US, the EU, Australia, Japan, China, India, New Zealand, South Korea, and ASEAN.[7] This is understandable because the US and the UK are the top destinations for studying abroad for people from other parts of the world as well. The preference of Southeast Asian people is completely in line with the general global trend.

Changing perceptions from 2019 until now

Since 2019, there have been changes in Southeast Asian respondents’ views on the most serious challenge facing Southeast Asia; the US’s engagement with the region; and the leading country/organization in championing the global free trade agenda as well as upholding the rule of law and international law.

The most serious challenges facing Southeast Asia: The respondents’ outlook on the most serious challenges facing Southeast Asia has remarkably changed from 2019 until now. In 2019, the three most severe issues confronting Southeast Asia were domestic political instability, ethnic and religious tensions, as well as climate change.[8] In 2020, these were domestic political instability (including ethnic and religious tensions), economic downturn, and intense weather events resulting from climate change.[9] In 2021 and 2022 when COVID-19 was raging in Southeast Asia, the pandemic’s threat to health was said to be the most serious challenge to the region.[10] In 2023, the four most serious challenges for Southeast Asia are unemployment and economic recession, climate change, increased military tensions arising from potential flashpoints, as well as widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity.[11]

Changes in perceptions of the US under the Trump Administration and the Biden Administration: Under the Trump Administration, the US was believed to be disinterested in Southeast Asia, not a strategic partner and provider of regional security, and also not trusted to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. On the contrary, under the Biden Administration, the US is said to become increasingly engaged in Southeast Asia. It is now seen as a strategic partner and provider of regional security, and it is trusted to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. The 2019 and 2020 surveys, carried out when former President Donald Trump was still in office, showed the respondents’ negative impression of the US. In particular, most thought that the US’s engagement with Southeast Asia had declined or declined significantly.[12] The majority had either no confidence or little confidence that the US was a strategic partner and a provider of regional security.[13] However, the surveys conducted in the following years show the respondents' positive outlook. Most respondents now believe the US’s engagement with the region has increased or increased substantially. They are confident that the US is a strategic partner and provider of regional security, and they are confident that the US will contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance.[14] Among the reasons for the respondents’ distrust of the US,[15] the most selected reason is that the US is distracted with its internal affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues.[16] Among the reasons for the respondents’ trust in the US,[17] the most selected reason is that the US has vast economic resources and the political will to provide global leadership.[18]

The leading country/organization in championing the global free trade agenda: The respondents’ perception of the leading country/organization that champions the global free trade agenda[19] changes each year. In 2020, the first time this topic was surveyed, Japan was the most selected option.[20] In 2021, the US took the first place.[21] In 2022, the US still dominated[22] but in 2023, ASEAN surprisingly take over.[23]

The leading country/organization in upholding the rule of law and international law: The respondents’ perception of the leading country/organization in upholding the rule of law and international law[24] also changes yearly. However, this change revolves only around the US and the EU. To be more specific, in 2020 and 2021, the EU was most believed to lead in upholding the rule of law and international law[25] while in 2022 and 2023, the US has taken over this position.[26]

Conclusion    

Although there are some limitations, such as small sample size compared to the whole population of Southeast Asia or biased answers, etc., the annual State of Southeast Asia Surveys are still valuable reference sources about regional perception of geopolitical challenges in Southeast Asia, as well as the role and influence of competition of major power competition to the region. These reports especially reflect the changes in the Southeast Asian views about regional and global situations every year. These reports can act as important data for the policy-making process of ASEAN and its member states against the backdrop that ASEAN is moving towards enhancing services for its people and businesses.

A Vietnamese version of the article was published here.

Translated by Ngân Hà. Revised by Ngân Đỗ, HD.

Notes:

[1] Read the annual State of Southeast Asia Surveys online at ISEAS <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/category/articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/>.

[2] Details: In 2019 and 2020, selected by 62% of respondents in 2019 and 73.2% in 2020, this concern ranked behind the concern about ASEAN’s tangible benefits not being felt by the people (selected by 72.6% of respondents in 2019 and 74.9% in 2020). In the following years, selected by 69.1% of the respondents in 2021, 61.5% in 2022, and 73% in 2023, this concern ranked after the concern that ASEAN is slow and ineffective, and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments (selected by 71.5% of respondents in 2021, 70.1% in 2022, and 82.6% in 2023). Read The 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.12; The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.8; The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.8; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.11 and The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.11.

[3] Details: In 2019, 45.2% of the respondents believed that China is the most influential economic power, while 73.3% believed that China is the most influential strategic and political power. In 2020, 79.2% of respondents believed that China is the most influential economic power and 52.2% believed that China is the most influential strategic and political power. In 2021, 76.3% of respondents believed that China is the most influential economic power and 49.1% believed that China is the most influential strategic and political power. In 2022, 76.7% of respondents believed that China is the most influential economic power and 54.4% believed that China is the most influential strategic and political power. In 2023, 59.9% believed that China is the most influential economic power and 41.5% believed that China is the most influential strategic and political power. Read The 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.20; The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.15; The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.20; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.20; The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.24.

[4] Details: In 2019, 51.5% of respondents had little to no confidence that China would “do the right thing” in contributing to global peace, security, prosperity and governance; in 2020, the percentage was 60.4%; in 2021, 63%; in 2022, 58.1%; and in 2023, 49.8%. Read The 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p. 26; The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.43; The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.42; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.42; and The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.44.

[5] Details: In 2020, 48% of respondents believed that ASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers, while 31.3% believed that ASEAN should continue its position of not siding with China or the US. In 2021, 53.8% of respondents believed that ASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers, while 29.9% believed that ASEAN should continue its position of not siding with China or the US. In 2022, 46.1% of respondents believed that ASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers, while 26.6% believed that ASEAN should continue its position of not siding with China or the US. In 2023, 45.5% of respondents believed that ASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers, while 30.5% believed that ASEAN should continue its position of not siding with China or the US. Read The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.28; The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p. 32; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.31; and The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.36.

[6] Details: In 2019, 65.9% of respondents trusted Japan, and only 21.7% trusted India (ranked fourth, before China and after the US). In 2020, 61.2% of respondents trusted Japan, and only 16% trusted India (ranked fifth). In 2021, 67.1% of respondents trusted Japan; India ranked fourth, higher than China, with the trust of 19.8% of respondents. In 2022, 54.2% of respondents trusted Japan, and India ranked fifth, lower than China, with 16.6% of respondents. In 2023, Japan continues to rank first, selected by 54.4% of respondents, while India remains fifth with 25.7%. Read The 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.31; The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.53; The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.52; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.52; và The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.54.

[7] Details: In 2019, among the six listed options (the US, a European country, Australia, Japan, an ASEAN country, China, and India), the US was the top choice, selected by 31.5% of respondents, followed by a European country, chosen by 28.4% of respondents. Perhaps in 2019, Brexit has not ended, so the ISEAS has yet to list the UK as a separate option. In 2020, among ten countries (the US, the UK, Australia, an EU country, Japan, New Zealand, an ASEAN country, China, South Korea, and India), the US was selected by 29.3% of respondents, and the UK was selected by 23.3%. In 2021, among the ten options, the US was chosen by 29.7% of respondents, while the UK was selected by 19.9%. In 2022, the US was selected by 25.6% of respondents, while the UK was selected by 20.8%. In 2023, the US was selected by 25.2% of respondents, while the UK was selected by 15.9%. Read The 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.33; The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.54; The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.53; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.53; and The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.55.

[8] Among the six listed concerns: economic recession, terrorism, ethnic and religious tensions, increased military tensions, domestic political instability, and climate change. Read The 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.11.

[9] Among the five listed challenges: economic recession; domestic political instability including ethnic and religious tensions; terrorism and increasing military tensions arising from the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and Korean Peninsula; more intense and frequent weather events resulting from climate change (droughts, floods, cyclones, rising sea levels, etc.). Read The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.7.

[10] Among the eight listed challenges: deteriorating human rights conditions; domestic political instability; increased military tensions arising from the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and Korean Peninsula; climate change and more intense and frequent weather events; terrorism; the COVID-19 pandemic’s threat to health; unemployment and economic recession; widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity. Read The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.7, and The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.8.

[11] The eight challenges are deteriorating human rights conditions, domestic political instability, increased military tensions arising from potential flashpoints, climate change and more intense and frequent weather events, terrorism, US-China decoupling, unemployment and economic recession, widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity. Read The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.9.

[12] Among the five options: decreased significantly, decreased, not changed, changed, and increased significantly. Read The 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.16, and The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.39.

[13] Among the five options: no confidence, little confidence, no comment, confident, very confident. Read The 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.17, and The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.40.

[14] Details: in 2021, 61% of respondents believed that the US’s engagement with the region increased or increased significantly; 55.4% were confident or very confident that the US was a strategic partner and provider of regional security; and 48.3% were confident or very confident that the US would contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. In 2022, 45.8% of respondents believed that the US’s engagement with the region increased or increased significantly; 42.6% were confident or very confident that the US was a strategic partner and provider of regional security; and 52.8% were confident or very confident that the US would contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. In 2023, 39.4% of respondents believed that the US’s engagement with the region increased or increased significantly; 47.2% were confident or very confident that the US was a strategic partner and provider of regional security; and 54.2% were confident or very confident that the US would contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. Read The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.39, p.40 and p.50; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.38, p.39 and p.50; and The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.42, p.43 and p.52.

[15] Including: the US does not have the capacity or political will for global leadership; my country’s political culture and worldview are incompatible with the US; the US is distracted with its internal affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues; the US’s economic and military power could be used to threaten my country’s interests and sovereignty; and the US is not a responsible or reliable power.

[16] Read The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.52; The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.51; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.51; and The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.53.

[17] Including: the US has vast economic resources and the political will to provide global leadership; my country’s political culture and worldview are compatible with the US’s; the US is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law; and the respect and admiration for the US’s civilization and culture.

[18] The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.52; The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.51; The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.51; and The 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.53.

[19] Among the eleven countries and organizations: Australia, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the US, Russia, ASEAN, and the UK.

[20] The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.19.

[21] The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.24.

[22] The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.24.

[23] The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.28.

[24] Of the eleven countries and organizations mentioned in [19].

[25] The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.20, and The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.25.

[26] The 2020 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.26, and The 2021 State of Southeast Asia Survey, p.30.