Is "Bipartisan Consensus" on China Witnessed across Different U.S. Government Levels?

On December 21, 2024, The Diplomat published a series of articles by Floran Yan, based on her research at the FPRI Institute. The series examines the United States’ approaches towards China through state-level legislative documents and proposals, focusing on how state governors’ policies and rhetorics related to China have been "securitized" from 2005 to 2024. It also explores whether a "bipartisan consensus" on China really exists at the state level.

 

The below are several observations that can be drawn from the study’s findings.

1. US-China strategic competition at the federal level might influence states’ policies

• The study concludes that states’ attitudes towards China have become increasingly negative since the federal government began promoting comprehensive competition with China. From 2005 to 2019, US governors viewed China positively, focusing on economic and educational cooperation. However, from 2022 onwards, “the China challenge” was mentioned more frequently, with US governors linking China to security risks, similar to federal arguments rather than issues directly related to voters.
• Concerns about China transcended traditional partisan disagreement at the state level, mirroring trends in the US Congress. In 2023, state legislative proposals on China were primarily introduced or sponsored by the Republican Party (238 proposals, accounting for 71.3%), but a significant percentage of proposals were passed with bipartisan support—over 60% of security-related proposals.
• “The China issue” was also politicized in gubernatorial elections, similar to the federal level. During the 2022-2024 elections, candidates deliberately used the phrase “threat from China” to rally voters, even when China was not a top concern. State-level candidates from both parties even criticize their opponents for not being tough enough on China.

2. State-Level China policies still retain a considerable degree of flexibility, and might sometimes influence or be inconsistent with federal-level policies

• State leaders’ rhetorics and stances might adjust in accordance with their constituents’ specific needs. For instance, during the 2023 Mississippi gubernatorial elections, Governor Tate Reeves (GOP) criticized his Democratic opponent for receiving a 10.000-dollar donation from a Chinese business, described China as a “threat” to American people while commenting on measures banning imports of Chinese-made drones. However, in 2024, Reeve’s team changed their stance, calling a Chinese company “respectable” after receiving funds for a local EV battery project.
• Sub-state groups often find their own room for maneuver without strictly following federal directives. In Missouri, while the state introduced policies to address the challenge from China, sub-state groups continued to promote cooperation with China. Similarly, in Hawaii, the state promoted competition with China, yet the Democratic Party sponsored six bills to foster economic and cultural ties with China and a resolution to establish sister-state relations between Honolulu and Fujian province. In Ohio, Senator Mike Braun opposed negotiating with China and passed a bill to ban Chinese nationals from buying agricultural land but continued to cooperate with China through his own automobile company, and even leasing land near the company’s headquarter to Chinese firms.

These trends illustrate that, while a “bipartisan consensus” on competing with China exists, it is not consistent. The further away from the federal level, the more flexible the policy becomes, and sometimes the substance lies in the low-level actions.

 

This flexibility stems from various factors. Lower-level politicians need to address specific local concerns, such as water security, agriculture, or climate change, many of which require substantive cooperation with China. Additionally, the room for maneuver expands when state and federal governments are controlled by opposing parties. China also utilizes subnational and sub-state channels and Chinese groups to influence US policy and US-China relations, particularly when the lobbying environment at the state level is usually friendlier to small organizations, with lower costs and less competitive than the federal level.