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Activities of the Claimants

China

China imposes fishing restrictions around Scarborough Shoal

Surveillance ships deployed by China in the Scarborough Shoal are imposing a 24-kilometer wide ban on fishing in the area, according to some fishermen in Masinloc, Zambales. China has virtually occupied Scarborough Shoal since last year after the Philippine government ordered the withdrawal of its vessels following a tense standoff triggered by the effort to apprehend Chinese poachers in the area.

Foreign Minister of China visits ASEAN Secretariat

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Wang Yi, the newly appointed Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China today called on the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Le Luong Minh at the ASEAN Secretariat. During their meeting, SG Minh and Foreign Minister Wang Yi exchanged views on a wide range of topics, including ways and means to further strengthen the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership. SG Minh and Foreign Minister Wang Yi also exchanged views on the issue of the South China Sea. They emphasised the importance of ensuring full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and moving towards the conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). They reaffirmed that maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and the region continues to be of paramount importance.

Frigate commissioned for South China Sea fleet

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A frigate was commissioned for the South China Sea fleet of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy on May 3rd, the China News Service has reported. The frigate Yueyang is capable of long-range surveillance, as well as air defense and anti-submarine operations, according to the report.

Vietnam

Vietnam requests China to stop wrong doings on Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago

Vietnam asks China to end its wrong actions on Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago in order to not affect peace and stability in the East Sea, said Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Luong Thanh Nghi. Nghi made the request in Hanoi on April 30th while answering reporters’ queries on Vietnam’s response to some recent acts of China on the area of Hoang Sa archipelago, including the senior Chinese officials’ cutting of the ribbon to inaugurate the Xinhua bookstore on Hoang Sa’s Phu Lam island, bringing tourists to the archipelago and preparing for a fishing competition on the Hoang Sa archipelago area. “Vietnam affirms its indisputable sovereignty over Hoang Sa archipelago. The above-mentioned actions of the Chinese side seriously violated Vietnam’s sovereignty and ran counter to the agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues between Vietnam and China,” the spokesperson said. Those acts did not comply with the Joint Statement of the 15 th ASEAN-China Summit on the 10 th Anniversary of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC) and violated the DOC, causing tension and complicating the East Sea situation, he added.

Full statement

The Philippines

Philippines to buy 2 new frigates

The Philippine Department of National Defense will purchase two brand new frigates for the Navy through public bidding, instead of the second-hand ones it had originally planned to acquire, a department official said April 29th. The project cost will have to be increased to P18 billion from the original amount earmarked for the purchase, P11.7 billion. Countries that have expressed interest in supplying the frigates include South Korea, Singapore and Spain.

Arbitration of sea dispute could take 2-3 years

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In an interview, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario admitted that the Philippines resorted to arbitration after China repeatedly committed various infractions and violations of the Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the East Sea (DOC) and international law regarding the disputed waters. "Arbitation for us is the last resort after exhaustion of various approaches including political and diplomatic. We believe that arbritation is an open, friendly and durable solution. It's good for all countries. For China, I think we are finally able to clarify with this arbitration China's maritime entitlements. They can say to their constituents: 'This is what international law entitles us to,'" he said in an interview on ANC's Headstart. Asked how long the arbitration case will last, he said: "It will probably take several years. Maybe 2-3 years."

Australia

Australia to publish Defence White Paper

On May 3rd, Australia government published Defence White Paper 2013, updating Australian policy since the last Defence White Paper in 2009, taking account of a number of changed circumstances: an economic, strategic and military shift to the Indo-Pacific region; the drawdown of Australian forces in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands; the US re-balance towards Asia Pacific; and the budgetary consequences of the Global Financial Crisis. It sets out strategic frameworks and also Australia’s plans on major aircraft, ship and submarine procurements. According to the White Paper, Australia will contribute to military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, with priority given to Southeast Asia. The White Paper also highlights Vietnam as a growing defence partner for Vietnam, saying that the Australian government seeks to build its strategic and practical defence engagement with Vietnam due to its growing regional prominence and strong influence in ASEAN, including through maritime security and counter-terrorism activities. Australia will also expand cooperation through enhanced training and education, senior-level dialogues and people-to-people links with the Vietnam People’s Army. In addition, the White Paper confirmed that the alliance with the U.S. still plays the most important role in Australian policy and highlighted the development of the relationship between Australia and Japan in the areas of security, defence.

Regional Snapshots

Chinese Foreign Minister to visit four Southeastern Asian countries

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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi paid official visits to Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei from April 30th to May 5th. On May 1st, in the press conference after the talk with Suraporn Tovichakchaikul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Wang talked about the three adherences in China's ASEAN policy. Wang said China's new leadership will adhere to prioritizing the good-neighborly and friendly cooperation with ASEAN in its peripheral diplomacy, adhere to consolidating strategic partnership with ASEAN and adhere to conducting friendly consultations and mutually beneficial cooperation to properly handle differences and problems with some members of the bloc. On May 2nd, Wang Yi met with his Indonesian counterpart Marty Natalegawa in Jakarta. “Mr. Wang Yi and I have just agreed to push the discussion of the South China Sea CoC [Code of Conduct] through the ASEAN-China Working Group mechanism,” Marty said in the joint press conference after the meeting. Wang, echoed Marty’s statement, saying China would always support efforts to settle disputes in the South China Sea through consultation with relevant countries. On May 3rd, Wang Yi met with Singapore’s leaders. On the South China Sea issue, the press statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore clearly stated that both sides agreed on the need for ASEAN and China to work actively on the way forward for an early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea on the basis of consensus. In his visit to Brunei on May 4th, the two sides issued a joint press release saying that all parties should implement the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in a comprehensive and effective way, carry out and strengthen maritime practical cooperation, advance the Code of Conduct (COC) progress in a step by step manner during the implementation of the consensus. In this process, all parties should increase communication, build consensus, promote mutual trust and confidence.

Commentaries & Analyses

ASEAN reboots on South China Sea

By Vignesh Ram

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Leadership will play a strong role in ASEAN's direction and decision making in the months ahead. Brunei's claims in the South China Sea are small compared to the Philippines and Vietnam and it has been the least vocal claimant in pressing its maritime claims. That can be viewed as both a strength and weakness, analysts say. The grouping's members realize that they cannot isolate any major power from their calculus in the evolving system in world affairs and rising economic integration, including with China. But if not properly handled, escalating disputes in the South China Sea threaten to upset the regional peace and stability that has fostered recent unprecedented economic growth in the region, much of it driven by growing trade with China. China no doubt realizes that other regional powers, including the US, are quietly observing developments in the maritime disputes and making their own strategic calculations. After years of peaceful commercial diplomacy, Beijing would seemingly prefer to avoid pushing ASEAN towards these regional competitors while weakening its strategic position in its own perceived sphere of influence. In this complex geopolitical game, regional powers like Indonesia will be compelled to hold ASEAN together and support smaller claimant states such as Brunei to benefit from its distinctive position vis-a-vis China. An ASEAN consensus on the South China Sea would represent a powerful strategic counterweight to China and mitigate the risks of over-reliance on outside powers like the US to provide strategic balance. To maintain the regional peace, ASEAN needs to recommit to its founding principles of unity and consensus. While Brunei may have the intention and incentive to push that agenda, it is still not clear it has the weight or authority to bring ASEAN back together and achieve a meaningful peace vis-a-vis China in the South China Sea.

Ambiguity afloat in South China Sea

By Roberto Tofani

The United States' indecisive ''pivot'' to the Asia-Pacific has created a situation of strategic ambiguity in the South China Sea. While regional countries believe that Washington will implement the policy, including its promise to base 60% of its naval assets to the region by 2020, it remains unclear how the shift will impact on the region's escalating maritime disputes. There are rising regional perceptions that the US intends to fortify its presence only to the degree that it does not upset China. The strategic ambiguity and questions of political will have pushed claimants in the disputes, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, to strengthen their alliances with other regional powers, including Australia, India and Japan. Some analysts believe the overlapping and somewhat competitive alliances could further destabilize the area as China begins to feel a sense of encirclement. The strategic hedging has been driven by questions about the US's fiscal ability to implement its ''pivot'' policy in a strategically meaningful and sustainable way. With significant planned military budget cuts in Washington, US regional allies and partners now wonder whether the US will be able to keep pace with China's rising defense spending, including significant funds to bolster its naval capabilities. Some regional analysts believe that the US, which has maintained it does not aim to ''contain'' China and hopes it will emerge as a ''responsible'' power in the region, intends to scale back its ''pivot'' policy to avoid the risk of irking China. In recent months, China has fortified its claims through more maritime patrols, signaling to some a hardening of Beijing's position in response to the perceived threat of foreign involvement in the theater, including the US's promised ''pivot''. There is the added complication that not all ASEAN states welcome a greater US military presence to counterbalance China. Indonesia, which has played a mediating role between China and ASEAN claimants such as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, is believed to prefer diplomacy over US-driven balance of power politics in the region. While some ASEAN states see a role for India and Japan in the South China Sea, others fear their involvement will further destabilize the situation. With or without a US ''pivot'', Beijing is less inclined than previously to accept multilateral dialogue, through ASEAN or elsewhere, to resolve its maritime disputes. Instead, it seems China is bent on consolidating its position to preempt greater future foreign involvement in the South China Sea. By deploying more naval patrols in contested areas, China has reinforced its claims and strengthened its strategic advantage. While the US's strategic aims remain ambiguous, China's seem increasingly clear.

How will China deal with region's distrust?

By Greg Torode

If there has been a running theme of this column, it has been the way countries across the region have been discreetly but actively co-operating to deal with the challenges of China's rise. It is not simply a case of a nervous neighbour of China's reaching out to a re-engaged US, but of nations big and small finding sudden shared interests in their mutual suspicions - a certain safety in numbers, if you like. Those suspicions emerged into plain view last week with reports from Tokyo that Japanese and Vietnamese officials will meet in Hanoi next month for their first formal discussions on maritime security. Tokyo has been reaching out to Manila in a similar fashion, and the latter is in turn reaching out to Hanoi. Indonesia is also active in co-operation that reaches beyond the troubled framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. While the Philippines and Vietnam have never been close, their disputes with China have pushed them much closer together. "We swap notes and we strategise in how to handle China," said one Philippine official recently. "Vietnam's old secrecy is breaking down and a strong relationship is developing." Then, of course, there is the Vietnam-US relationship - an intricate tango between former enemies. At times the ardour cools and the tempo slows, usually when Hanoi turns half an eye to the north and misses a few steps. At other moments, though, the band seems to be flying and the dancers' passion stirs anew. That seems the case now as Washington and Hanoi quietly resume stalled discussions over a future strategic partnership. China may preach the harmonious diplomacy of non-interference and say it is not an expansionist power, but the actions of its neighbours show Beijing is far from trusted. How that gap is narrowed will define the region's future.

Beijing at Sea

By C. Raja Mohan

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Nothing represents the political will in Beijing to pursue these new objectives better than the Liaoning. China's first aircraft carrier is also the pride of the Chinese people. It has become a powerful rallying point for Chinese patriotism and a catalyst for self-awareness of the nation's importance on the global stage. Besides the Liaoning, the Chinese navy is said to be building two carriers based on indigenous designs. China also has plans to build a fourth, nuclear-powered carrier. China might be late in acquiring carriers, but will have them in impressive numbers fairly soon. For the Chinese leadership, the Liaoning, formally commissioned into service last year after many sea trials, is not about prestige. It is meant to fulfill "the historic missions" for the Chinese armed forces in the modern era, which were identified by the communist leadership nearly a decade ago. The 18th congress of the Communist Party of China last year declared that the defense of the nation's "maritime rights and interests" was one of China's highest strategic priorities. The new political directive is, in part, about defending China's expansive territorial claims in the East and South China seas. It also underlines the centrality of maritime security for China's economic progress and national well being. China's latest white paper on defense, issued last week, explained Beijing's new focus on maritime issues. The navy, the white paper said, naturally has the lead role in the "strategy to exploit, utilize and protect the seas and oceans, and build China into a maritime power". Beijing's unfolding outward military orientation is an inevitable consequence of the globalization of the Chinese economy. As China's interests extend way beyond its borders, it is naturally looking to project military power. This predictable evolution, however, will have significant consequences that China's neighbors and other powers must prepare to cope with.

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