On November 1, 2025, the defense ministers of Australia, the Philippines (PLP), Japan, and the United States – often referred to as the “SQUAD”) – met in Kuala Lumpur and issued a joint readout on November 3. This was their fifth defense-ministers’ meeting in the past three years.
 
According to the readout, the four countries: (i) voiced “serious concern” over China’s “destabilizing” behavior in the South China Sea; affirmed UNCLOS and the 2016 South China Sea (SCS) Arbitral Award; (ii) pledged to strengthen deterrence and operational readiness; (iii) committed to enhance coordinated defense cooperation; and (iv) supported framework for establishing a joint Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Cooperation Council.
 
Key takeaways from the meeting:
  • The SQUAD is increasingly “institutionalized.” While the 4th readout (May 2025) only called for “regularly convening meetings at ministerial and officials’ levels,” the 5th readout, for the first time, supports the framework for establishing a cooperation council among the four countries’ Chiefs of Defense, marking a shift from cooperation via periodic ministerial meetings to standing, continuous operational coordination. Some analysts see this as a step towards turning SQUAD into a “formal” minilateral alongside AUKUS and the QUAD.
  • The SQUAD emphasizes interoperability at sea. Since 2023, “operational coordination and interoperability” has emerged as a core pillar of SQUAD cooperation. This was affirmed as one of the group’s four key development pillars in the 4th readout. Of the 26 Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCAs) organized by the Philippines in Philippine waters since late 2023, three MCAs witnessed participation by all four SQUAD members (April 7, 2024; September 28, 2024; February 5, 2025); individual partners also joined frequently: the United States (20 times), Japan and Australia (9 times). The 2026 Balikatan exercise will be the first time all four countries’ forces conduct a joint military exercise, as noted in the November 3 readout.
  • A stronger message to China in the SCS. The November 3 readout, for the first time, specifically states that the 2016 SCS arbitral award is “final and legally binding,” whereas the 4th readout only mentioned upholding international law and UNCLOS. Also on November 1, the United States and the Philippines announced the creation of a joint task force to strengthen cooperation and operational readiness in the South China Sea.
In response, China firmly rejected the “false narrative” of “certain countries,” asserting: (i) the “SCS arbitration” was a “political farce masquerading as a legal process”; countries should stop using maritime issues to sow discord; and (ii) the Indo-Pacific is not a chessboard for geopolitical competition; group politics and bloc confrontation are not conducive to regional stability.
 
Edit and translated by MN
Read the original article in Vietnamese here
 
https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2025/11/8c97000877b4b6c7f1e1d0a16e3f1819fe0c7e6b.html 
https://sg.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-meeting-of-defense-ministers-from-australia-japan-the-philippines-and-the-united-states/ 
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/11/03/2484589/ph-us-japan-australia-back-plan-new-defense-council-amid-china-tensions 
https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/11/us-philippines-launch-military-task-force-for-areas-including-south-china-sea/ 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202511/t20251106_11748399.html  
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3331776/philippines-seeking-formalise-squad-alliance-its-partners