29/11/2011
China has presented the United States with a golden opportunity to reaffirm a principled stand on South China Sea issues and thus strengthen its alliances and partnerships with other states in Asia. Beijing’s excessive claim and assertive behavior by elements of China’s maritime agencies in the South China Sea have alienated many governments in the rest of Asia. In the South China Sea, Beijing is playing directly to American strengths, support for freedom of navigation and overwhelming naval capabilities in Asia. The United States has taken advantage of China’s mistakes.
For a decade, the South China Sea has been a potentially significant security issue waiting to rise to the surface of American policy makers’ consciousness. Between the collision of a Chinese jet fighter with an American surveillance airplane in April 2001 and Chinese harassment of the USNS Impeccable in March 2009, the South China Sea had largely disappeared from the policy agenda of the U.S. government and policy community. China’s actions reawakened U.S. interest and provoked a reaffirmation of U.S. policy.
South China Sea issues rose to the surface at the same time as the current U.S. administration declared America’s return to Asia. They have become a major component of U.S. policy in Asia. Over the past two years, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and former Secretary of Defense Gates have repeatedly stated that the U.S. has a “national interest” in freedom of navigation and the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.
In a recent article on U.S. foreign policy, Clinton outlined a plan to pivot to Asia as America begins to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan. She argued that the Asia- Pacific has become the key driver of global politics and sketched out a new American regional strategy. However, as a global power, the United States is also concerned about several competing priorities outside Asia, including how to react to the “Arab Spring” uprisings in the Middle East.
Nonetheless, for the United States, developments in the South China Sea now apparently rank with such traditional issues as North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran in Clinton’s discussions with her Chinese counterparts. An initial internal debate about the depth of U.S. interests in the South China Sea and the potential impact of U.S. South China Sea policies on Sino-U.S. relations as a whole appears to have been, at least temporarily, resolved.
Diplomacy has the leading role in the implementation of U.S. policy, though the U.S. is also seeking to enhance the capabilities of several Southeast Asian states’ armed forces and altering U.S. force posture in the region. The goal is not to contain China but to shape its behavior in the South China Sea and more broadly in Asia. At the same time, the United States benefits from improved relations with Asian countries that are also concerned about China’s growing influence and military power.
The South China Sea is likely to remain a significant foreign policy issue for the United States for the foreseeable future.
U.S. Return to Asia
A recurring theme of President Obama’s administration has been its commitment to return to Asia. Breaking with precedent, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s first official visit was to Asia. The U.S. has continued to strengthen ties to key allies and deepen strategic and comprehensive partnerships with such emerging Asian powers as India and Indonesia. Washington has bet on New Delhi. The two capitals have intensified a previously anemic bilateral dialogue to include discussion of a wide variety of issues in Asia, and now plan to include Japan in this process. The Korea- U.S. free trade agreement is about to be approved by the U.S. Congress. A Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement is moving forward, and several additional Southeast Asian countries are interested in joining this partnership. The U.S. has reversed the Bush administration’s indifferent and occasionally antagonistic attitude to regional multilateral organizations.
This return requires a much more extensive interaction with China. As Clinton recently wrote “China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage.”[1] After an initial deterioration in the relationship following U.S. President Obama’s assumption of office, Sino-U.S. relations rebounded. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s early 2011 visit to the United States was a success. A new Strategic and Economic Dialogue has been launched with China.
With regard to Southeast Asia, Washington signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The Obama administration has stated that it views ASEAN as the “fulcrum” for regional issues and appointed an Ambassador to ASEAN. This November, President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time.
In addition, bilateral ties have been significantly strengthened with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. The Obama administration’s commitment to a “geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable force posture” in Asia requires Washington to examine “how we can increase our operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and deepen our contacts with allies and partners.”[2]
Clinton, in an article entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” harks back to the U.S. post - World War II legacy of transatlantic ties and compares the successful American initiatives of that era, such as NATO, with current opportunities in Asia. She believes “the time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power.” Clinton refers repeatedly to the South China Sea as an issue of equal importance with such long-standing flashpoints such as the Korean peninsula, which directly, legally and strategically implicate core American interests. She writes that “Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players.”
A striking feature of the article is a statement that “we have made strides in protecting our vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation and have paved the way for sustained multilateral diplomacy among the many parties with claims in the South China Sea, seeking to ensure disputes are settled peacefully an in accordance with established principles of international law.”
In late October in Bali at a meeting of ASEAN defense ministers, new U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta said “even with the budget constraints that we are facing in the United States” there is “no question that the Pacific will be a priority” to … “protect international rights to be able to move across the oceans freely.”[3]
However, America’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific depends on its ability to extricate U.S. forces from Afghanistan, to manage a difficult relationship with Pakistan, and to maintain sufficient capabilities in the Middle East to curb Iranian adventurism. In addition, the United States spent at least $700 billion on the U.S. intervention in Iraq and a decade building up its forces and capabilities to suppress insurgencies. Now, it will need to overcome bureaucratic challenges to realign its armed forces and budgets to meet conventional, primarily naval, challenges in Asia.
To stimulate South China Sea regional security cooperation in the control of piratical attacks against ships, this paper proposes the establishment of a limited purpose maritime and air defence identification zone over the South China Sea.
The Philippines recently passed a 2009 Baselines Law that, it was hoped, would finally confront its long-standing dilemma on whether to abandon its 1898 “treaty lines” altogether and adopt the modern rules on the Law of the Sea. That hope did not come to pass.
Abstract The interplay of power and law in the South China Sea is not well understood. To analyze the disputes over navigation rights, sovereignty to islands, and delimitation of maritime zones we need to grasp how states define and defend their geopolitical interests as well as the ways in which...
Introduction Much of the legal discussion about the ongoing situation in the South China Sea focuses upon the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[1], a convention that was concluded in 1982. During that early 1980's timeframe, there was an iconic television commercial[2] in...
Since 1999, China has enacted an annual fishing ban for two or three months in the summer in the North-Western part of the South China Sea. This year (2011), the ban took place from May 16th to August the 1st and in an area between the latitude 12° North to the North and longitude 113° East to the West.[1]Any...
The Duty to Cooperate in Semi-Enclosed Seas The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea governed by Part IX of the Law of the Sea Convention,[1] which says in Article 123 that countries bordering such seas “should co-operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and the performance...