In a recent episode of the “South China Sea Update: Will the U.S. Really Defend the Philippines Against China?” podcast - part of the independent China-Global South project led by journalist Eric Olander, guest scholar Ray Powell (SeaLight Project, Stanford University) discussed U.S. defense commitments to the Philippines.
Notably, Powell observed that unlike Japan or South Korea, which President Donald Trump criticized as developed nations shielded by U.S. security guarantees, the Philippines is viewed as a small but resilient nation thanks to its transparency-based strategy in confronting China.
Powell’s remarks raise broader questions about how the United States conceptualizes its alliances.
1/ The Selective Criticism of Free-Riding
The Trump administration has long accused U.S. allies of “taking advantage” of American security guarantees by underinvesting in their own defense. These criticisms have targeted not only Japan and South Korea but also NATO allies in Europe. This view reflects the transactional logic of the Trump 2.0 approach: allies are labeled as “free-riders” if they rely on U.S. security protection without providing proportional defense budget contributions.
However, research by Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer suggests that free-riding is a pervasive feature of alliances and cannot be measured solely by economic size or defense spending levels. In the case of NATO, for instance, both low and high-GDP member states exhibit dependence on U.S. security guarantees.
Empirically, only a subset of allies are openly and harshly criticized by the U.S. While Japan and South Korea have been frequently singled out, the Philippines, as a modest defense spending ally, has thus far avoided such public rebuke.
This raises the question: Are assessments of “free-riding” truly based on financial burden-sharing, or are they shaped by shifting U.S. strategic priorities and calculations of interest?
2/ Strategic Utility of Free-Riding
Being labeled a “free-rider” does not necessarily imply strategic irrelevance or irresponsibility. On the contrary, such allies can reduce U.S. operational costs. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), overseas basing becomes more cost-efficient when host nations contribute infrastructure, logistics, or tax exemptions. In 2024, Japan financed 60.2% of U.S. basing costs, while South Korea contributed 43.3%.
Additionally, burden-sharing involves more than defense budgets. Allies contribute through political support, diplomatic alignment, access to military facilities, and economic partnerships.
In some cases, lower defense spending may reflect a reduced perception of threat rather than a lack of commitment or responsibility.
The tendency to narrowly quantify allied contributions fails to capture the complexity of alliance politics. While this “quick-score” approach may help the U.S. pressure allies and signal collective resolve toward China, it also risks undermining trust and cohesion within the U.S.’ broader alliance network.
Edited and translated by HCRead the full article in Vietnamese here
