PLA Navy's Trainings/Exercises in the Western Pacific

In the first week of June 2025, for the first time, the Chinese Navy deployed both of its aircraft carrier groups - Liaoning and Shandong - to conduct joint training (exercises) in the Pacific Ocean. This operation was carried out beyond the “second island chain”, in an area encompassing Iwo Jima, Okinotorishima, and Guam. During the exercise, a J-15 fighter jet from the Shandong made a dangerously close approach of less than 45 meters to a Japanese patrol helicopter, sparking concerns over the risk of unintended aerial collisions, despite the activity taking place in international waters.

 

Japan’s Ministry of Defense confirmed that the two Chinese carrier groups operated in separate areas: the Liaoning in waters near Minamitorishima, and the Shandong to the north of the Bonin Islands. The Shandong conducted experimental takeoff and landing operations for its J-15 fighter jets and helicopters. This marks the first simultaneous deployment of both PLA Navy aircraft carriers in the region, signaling a notable shift in China’s naval operational approach.

 

The Chinese Ministry of National Defense stated that the event was merely part of its “annual training program” conducted in accordance with international law and not aimed at any specific country.

 

In response, Japanese and Western media expressed concern over the shifting regional security balance, though they diverged in assessing the degree of threat posed by China's military maneuvers. According to Professor Daisuke Kawai (University of Tokyo), the exercise represents a major strategic escalation. He argues that China aims to test the Japanese government’s response threshold without crossing legal boundaries that would constitute violations of international law.

 

Western outlets such as Reuters, AP, and The Wall Street Journal interpreted the move as part of China's broader efforts to build a blue-water navy, paving the way for operations in more distant waters, including capabilities for blockade and anti-access missions in the waters surrounding Taiwan. The objective, these sources suggest, is to tighten control over Taiwan as the 2027 milestone approaches.

 

Conversely, in line with official statements, Chinese scholars and media characterized the exercise as nothing more than a “routine training” aimed at “enhancing far-sea defense capabilities.” Chinese military expert Wang Yunfei noted that the Liaoning had previously operated in the Western Pacific, and thus, the expanded range of activity this time is unsurprising. He asserted that in the future, Chinese aircraft carriers are expected to operate in even more remote maritime zones.

 

The scope of the activity, its operational nature, and the diverging interpretations by involved parties indicate that this dual-carrier exercise represents a significant step in China’s ongoing military modernization and operational expansion. This is no longer a coastal simulation or near-shore drill but a concrete implementation of the “far-seas defense” (远海防卫) strategy, which is a part of China’s ambition to become a global naval power by 2035.

 

This advancement in PLA Navy capabilities is also expected to generate security pressure on the United States and its allies, especially as Washington ramps up its re-engagement with the Indo-Pacific, reinforcing its military presence in Guam, the Philippines, and Japan. At the same time, Japan is increasing its defense budget and expanding the security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.